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The main focus of my thesis lies on very large international cross border transactions and the 
question whether they create or destroy shareholder value. Beginning with a short overview 
of M&A history and the most recent merger waves I will try to outline the basic stages of an 
M&A transaction, the different rationales behind it and the sources and limits of value 
creation. Emphasizing the whole aspect of an M&A transaction not only implies the actual 
merger but also it’s long term implementation and the corresponding difficulties related to 
integration. I will primarily refer to very large cross border transactions, since they have been 
increasingly popular in recent years and provide an interesting base for further research, due 
to their increased complexity and impact as compared to “normal” mergers. In order to 
provide a practical example of very large cross border M&A I use two case studies. The case 
studies concern the merger of two major international car manufacturers during the previous 
merger wave in the late nineties and demonstrate the opportunities and risks of international 
expansion through M&A. 
The first two chapters build the introductory part of the paper, where chapter 1 provides an 
overview of the several stages of an M&A transaction and a short summary of recent merger 
waves.  
Chapter 2 aims to motivate the reader to understand the different rationales for mergers and 
acquisitions and in the second part introduces horizontal mega mergers, especially large 
cross border transactions and strategic alliances as an alternative mean.  
Beginning with chapter 3 I try to elaborate the main issues related to value creation in mega 
mergers. In the first part I present the most important sources and limits to value creation. 
Consequently I summarize the findings of various sources regarding the factors, which most 
significantly influence value creation and can be referred to as value drivers. In the last 
section of chapter 3 I highlight the empirical evidence on value creation and examine the 
impact of transaction size on value creation, which is a central question of my thesis.  I 
further try to provide simple pre merger evaluation methods and performance measures, 
which should give the reader an understanding of how to asses such large scale transactions 
in advance.  
Chapter 4 comprises two case studies. The aim of this chapter is to relate the theoretical 
chapters to practical examples and further to demonstrate the important role of post merger 
integration. The last section of chapter 4 presents the reader with a conclusion indicating my 




1.1. Mergers and Acquisitions as a Source for Value Creation 
Mergers and acquisitions have surpassed an extraordinary booming phase during the last 
years, peaking in the beginning of 2007. According to Thomson Financial announced deal 
values have reached an all time record high of more than 3.5 trillion USD for 2006. A 
legitimate question, which has already been extensively studied by empirical research, with 
respect to Mergers and Acquisitions is whether M&A actually create value for the stake 
holders of the respective companies considering their managerial, monetary and time cost. A 
review of the value creating performance of M&A suggests that approximately only about 
50%, if not even less, are actually successful in  creating overall value. Despite the high risk 
of such corporate transactions, many corporations still consider M&A as an effective tool for 
future growth and a source for sustainable value creation. The ever more intensifying 
globalization, which considerably picked up momentum in the last decade with the arrival of 
Russia, India and China on the world markets, pushes large corporations to heavily expand 
internationally, either through organic growth, classical M&A or M&A related transactions 
such as strategic alliances. A global survey performed by Accenture1 supports my notion of 
the growing importance of large cross border acquisitions. The survey is based upon the 
answers of 420 senior executives from companies headquartered in the US and Europe. The 
survey aims to provide insights on M&A strategies and recent and potential M&A activity 
especially concerning cross border transactions.  
Some of the key findings of the survey suggest that most recent acquisitions have been 
cross border, where 58% of the respondents said that their most recent acquisition was a 
cross border one. 55% of the respondents replied that companies in their industries would be 
driven to acquire overseas in the next five years to guarantee the profitability of the business. 
49% confirmed that cross border M&A would be required to achieve all the targets of the 
stated corporate strategy. 26% stated that overseas acquisitions were imperative for 
surviving competition. The survey further indicated that M&A activity is indicated as the key 
for future revenue growth, whereby more than 50% confirm that global revenues have grown 
by 18% on average thanks to M&A activity. Another interesting finding is that companies 
often have a clear strategy on how to enter the market, but have difficulties related to the 
integration of acquisitions in foreign markets and dealing with cultural differences. Although 
some of the findings are contradicting with prior research and market data, this trend is likely 
to continue. 
 
                                               
1
 Accenture, “ Global M&A Survey – Executive Summary “, Economist Intellignece Unit, 2006, p1-2 
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1.2. M&A History and Recent Merger Waves 
A common finding in M&A literature which is also described by Sudi Sudarsanam2 is the fact 
that mergers and acquisitions occur in bursts interspersed with relative inactivity. This pattern 
referred to as the wave pattern of mergers has been observed in the U.S for more than 100 
years , in the U.K from 1960 on and more recently in Continental Europe. Research has still 
not fully understood what triggers these waves and why they subside but several possible 
explanatory factors have been identified. Based on his research and the empirical work of 
others Sudarsanam points out another phenomenon, which is that during merger waves 
mergers occur in certain industry clusters. This suggests that certain industries see 
abnormally intense merger activity at different times, thus there must be a relationship 
between industry specific factors triggering the wave pattern in clusters. Such behavior 
implies that companies imply their respective strategies close on the heels of one another. 
While some firms will be “first movers “others will rather be “me-too” runners. Increased 
takeover activity as referred to merger waves has occurred in several countries with the US 
seeing the most activity dating back to 1890. The very first merger waves in the late 19th, 
early 20th century were based upon the strategic intention to form monopoly, oligopolies or 
more recently growth. I will shortly consider the most recent merger waves starting with the 
eighties and going through the nineties and the very last wave, which peaked in 2006 and 
early 2007. The increased takeover activity during that period showed a growing tendency to 
take place on a global basis. The wave in the eighties was characterized by high 
simultaneous acquisition and divestiture activity. As Sudarsanam states, divestitures 
accounted for 20 to 40% of M&A activity during this period. Thus the main rationale behind 
that wave can be seen as corporate restructuring, where firms try to focus on a narrower 
range of businesses in which these companies already have or expect to develop 
competitive advantage by redirecting investment to them. Many firms were actually reversing 
the diversifying acquisitions, made during the conglomerate wave of the sixties. Shleifer and 
Vishny3 refer to the initial conglomerate expansion and subsequent return to the core 
businesses a “round trip”. Other important implications of the eighties wave were the 
emergence of hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts as well as the arrival of private equity 
firms as new players in the M&A environment.  
The wave during the nineties to some extend followed the notion of focusing on core 
competencies as a source of competitive advantage. The nineties saw the arrival of new 
                                               
2
 Sudi Sudarsanam, “Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions – The Challenges “, Prentice Hall 
International,2003, p13-20 
3
 A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny, “Takeovers in the 60s and the 80s: Evidence and Implications”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 12,1991, p51-59  
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technologies, which became accessible on a broad public basis for the first time such as the 
internet and mobile communication. As a consequence the impact of this wave was 
enormous as can be seen with the value of M&A deals, increasing from USD 324 bn. in the 
eighties wave to as much as USD 1.8 trillion in the US and about USD 3.38 trillion worldwide 
at its height in 2000. Despite this incredible development I must also say that especially 
deals concerning the new economy have been financed through share transactions, which 
were based on astronomic valuations, far from being realistic. Sudarsanam describes other 
important developments of the nineties wave as: 
 
 the imperative of shareholder value as a guide to corporate investment and financing 
decisions 
 the globalization of product, services and capital markets 
 mature industries such as automobiles ( which will be treated in greater detail with the 
case studies ), banking and food undergoing substantial restructuring 
 consolidation of fragmented industries by financial and strategic buyers     
 
The most current boom of M&A activity, which has not yet been ratified as a merger wave, 
probably due to its timeliness and the lack of data, has commenced in 2005 and lasted 
through mid 2007. The number and size of deals have reached new record levels, driven by 
a booming global economy especially in China, India, Russia but also a strong recovery of 
the U.S and Europe. The economic environment for M&A was very beneficial with solid 
corporate operational performance, cheap financing ( low interest rates ) and plenty of 
opportunities. The current boom has seen strong activity outside the U.S with record activity 
in Europe and Asia. This trend further underlines the growing impact of globalization. The 
already mentioned Accenture study4 points in the same direction and finds that most recent 
transactions have been cross border. The focus on core competencies and revenue growth 
continue to play a key role in M&A activity, while at the same time this wave has seen 
several large deals financed by financial investors, such as large funds and private equity 
firms. The rationale behind financial investors is of course a different story. In my view 
acquirers from a financial background have seized the opportunity of the availability of cheap 
financing. In many cases the outcome is still unclear. If the financial investors are able to 
optimize the operations of their acquired asset and thus increase profitability and create 
additional value, they will be likely to sell the asset with considerable profit within the next 
years. However the past chapter was intended to provide an idea why and in which 
                                               
4
 Accenture, “ Global M&A Survey – Executive Summary “, Economist Intellignece Unit, 2006, p1 
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economic environment mergers and acquisitions occur. It should have become clear that 
recent M&A are getting larger in volume and geographic reach. Thus I chose to concentrate 
on very large cross border transactions. 
 
1.3. The 5 Stages of the M&A Process 
Large cross border M&A are very complex and dependent upon a multitude of economic and 
non economic factors. Sudarsanam5 provides a simple comprehensive model, which 
captures these factors and divides the whole M&A process into five stages. 
 
1.3.1. Stage 1 – Corporate Strategy Development 
M&A are considered as a mean to achieve the objectives set forth in corporate strategy. As 
such the success of a transaction rises and falls with the corporate strategy behind it. 
Sudarsanam defines corporate strategy as a way of optimizing the portfolios of businesses a 
firm currently owns and in that respect how this portfolio can be changed to best serve the 
interests of the firm’s stakeholders. Business Literature has come up with several corporate 
strategy models based on different frameworks such as industry structure, competitive 
environment or the internal resources of a firm. For example under the industrial organization 
model of competition firms either choose cost leadership or product differentiation. This 
approach in general responds to Porter’s five forces – current rivalry, threat of entry of new 
competitors, threat of substitutes, buyer and seller power. Under this model firms acquire to 
gain additional market power, economies of scale and scope and to internalize vertically 
linked operations to achieve cost savings. Another recently popular model is the resource 
based view of competition. Here the internal resources of a firm are considered to be the 
essence of building firm and sustainable growth. These resources may be financial, human, 
intangible, physical, organizational and technological. Thus competitive advantage is derived 
from a firms unique organizational resources and capabilities rather than external industry 
and market factors. These resources are hard to imitate or substitute. Prahalad and Hamel6 
refer to this as the firm’s core competences, which are embedded in organizational routines 
and cultures. Sudarsanam notes that acquisitions under this approach can be seen as a 
                                               
5Sudi Sudarsanam, “Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions – The Challenges “, Prentice Hall 
International,2003, p3-8  
6
 C.K. Prahald, G. Hamel, “ The Core Competence of the Corporation “, Harvard Business Review, May/June 
1990, p79-91 
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search for partners with complementary resources and capabilities, which can be combined 
with the acquirers to enhance the competitive advantage of both firms. 
 
1.3.2. Stage 2 – Organizing for Acquisitions 
A diligent acquisition organization is an essential component of an M&A transaction. It is 
important to develop an understanding of the acquisition decision process, due to its later 
impact on the quality of the decision and its value creation logic. Some firms have their own 
M&A departments devoted to examining the feasibility of the transaction, searching potential 
targets, how to best organize and implement the transaction etc… In this respect it is 
important to notice that firms lacking the organization resources to properly plan and 
organize an acquisition, should not undergo such a transaction since the outcome is very 
likely to destroy shareholder value. 
 
1.3.3. Stage 3 – Deal Structuring 
Deal Structuring implies the organizational preparation and implementation of the transaction 
with the goal to find a legally binding merger agreement. Sudarsanam elaborated the main 
issues related to deal structuring and negotiation: 
 
 Valuing target companies and considering how the acquirer wants to leverage its own 
assets with those of the target 
 Choosing outside advisors to the deal such as investment banks, lawyers, 
accountants etc.. 
 Information gathering of the target from the target itself and other sources 
 Performing Due Diligence 
 Determination of negotiation parameters including the “walk away” price negotiating 
warranties and indemnities 
 Negotiating senior management positions in both firms in post-merger dispensation 
Developing appropriate bid and defence strategies and tactics 
 
1.3.4. Stage 4 – Post Acquisition Integration 
Post Acquisition Integration is a very important stage and often at least partly responsible for 
the failure of a merger. The main objective is to achieve the strategic and value expectations 
that initiated the merger. Sudarsanam suggests a change management program for 
11 
integration and distinguishes three types of change. These are a change of the target firm, 
the acquiring firm and a change in both firms in order to accommodate co-existence or fusion 
of the two organizations. Furthermore in order to be successful the change program should 
have well defined goals, teams, communication plans, deadlines, performance benchmarks, 
reward for meeting deadlines and benchmarks and sanctions for failures, etc. Retaining both 
companies’ key executives during the integration process and try to prevent them from going 
to competitors is also a major challenge of post merger integration. In this regard Canella 
and Hambrick7 find that “ Executives from an acquired firm are an intrinsic component of the 
acquired firm’s resource base and their retention is an important determinant of post-
acquisition performance.” This is especially true for large cross border mergers as cultural 
differences tend to be larger for example different pay packages for executive management 
etc.. There have been cases where whole departments were lured away by competitors 
during post merger integration. Overall post acquisition integration is a very complex task 
and depends on the circumstances of the merger. There is a multitude of others factors, 
which are to be considered, thus the past paragraph only addressed key components of a 
proper integration. 
 
1.3.5. Stage 5 – Post Acquisition Audit and Organizational Learning 
This stage is often neglected as the actual merger might already be several years behind, 
thus there is a lack of attention. Nevertheless in order to achieve the long term benefits of 
M&A one has to continuously encourage mutual organizational learning. Internal post merger 
audits for example on an annual basis provide a useful tool to ensure organizational learning 










                                               
7
 A.A. Canella Jr., D.C. Hambrick, “Effects of Executive Departures on the Performance of Acquired Firms “, 
Strategic Management Journal, 14, Special Issue 1993, p137-152 
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2. Basic Principles of M&A 
2.1. Perspectives ( Motivations ) for Mergers 
There exist several perspectives to explain the incidence of M&A. Thereof Sudarsanam8 
addresses the most common perspectives, which are economic, strategic, financial, 
managerial and organizational: 
2.1.1. The Economic Perspective 
The economic perspective is by far the most common rational for mergers. The basic 
principle here is cost reduction and/ or increased market power to gain competitive 
advantage. In the context of a large multinational firm cost reductions might be achieved 
through economies of scale and scope. Economy of scale implies that cost reductions in 
producing a product are achieved through increasing the sale of production in a given period. 
The fixed component of production costs such as rents, administrative costs etc..can be 
spread over a larger volume and thus average cost of production falls. It is important to note 
that there are limits to scale economy referred to as minimum efficient scale ( MES ). Beyond 
this point average production costs do not decrease with increasing volume. Scope economy 
occurs when the total cost of producing and selling several products by a multi-product firm is 
lower than the sum of costs for production and sale of the same products by individual firms. 
Scope economies can be achieved in R&D, marketing, distribution etc.. Scope economies 
depend on the firms certain capabilities and resources to share common applicability across 
several products. Scale and scope economies can be considered as a function of firm size 
thus “ big is beautiful and profitable “. Another popular economic motive is transaction cost 
economies and vertical integration. Here firms try to reduce transaction costs through vertical 
integration. 
2.1.2. Strategy Perspective 
The strategy perspective can be characterized by the need to acquire products, technologies 
and businesses complementing a firm’s core competencies and thus enhancing competitive 
advantage. In this context there exist several views on how to achieve the best competitive 
strategy. Porter9 identifies three generic competitive strategies, namely cost leadership, 
product differentiation or perceived customer benefits and segmental focus with either cost 
leadership or product differentiation. An increasingly popular approach is the resource based 
                                               
8
 Sudi Sudarsanam, “Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions – The Challenges “, Prentice Hall 
International,2003, p39-59 
9
 M. Porter, “ Competitive Advantage “, New York: Free Press, 1985, chapter7 
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view of competitive strategy. Under this perspective firms are not dependent on external 
factors but rather seen as proactively managing and shaping their competitive environment. 
Here competition is based on a firm’s internal resources and capabilities. The unique 
combination of resources and capabilities is what forms the competitive advantage. Barney10 
finds that, assuming that strategic resources and capabilities are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms, these differences may often persist to give firms a sustained competitive 
advantage. The main rationale for merging under the resource based view is to benefit from 
complementary resources and capabilities. In this context mergers should be considered as 
a dynamic process of capability accretion and creation and as a means of competitive 
positioning for the future. In this process firms build on their existing resources and 
capabilities and further obtain substantially new resources and capabilities. Or as Karim and 
Mitchell11 conclude, acquisitions are a change process. 
2.1.3. Finance Theory Perspective 
Sudarsanam states that the finance theory perspective considers merger decisions within the 
framework of conflicts arising among the financial claimholders of the firm. The main 
elements in this framework are shareholder wealth maximization; the agency model of the 
firm as a nexus of contracts and the characterization of managers as agents, agency costs 
and conflicts of interests between principal and agent; deviation from shareholder wealth 
maximization due to agency problems; internal corporate governance constraints on 
managerial self interest and external constraints through the market for corporate control. In 
this context Berle and Means12 observe increasing separation of ownership from control 
resulting from diffusion of share ownership and the small proportion of shares held by the 
managers. Thus heavily dispersed ownership provides no incentive or means for small 
shareholders to monitor management performance, which in term may enable managers to 
take decisions enhancing their private benefits at the expense of shareholder interests. 
Jensen and Meckling13 have developed the agency model of the firm. In this model the firm is 
considered as a nexus of contracts where firms receive capital through issuing equity and 
debt. In the case of equity shareholders are the principals who delegate the management of 
the firm to the agent ( manager ). Managers may pursue their own interests and thereby 
                                               
10
 J. Barney, “ Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage “, Journal of Management, Vol.17, 1991, 
p99-120 
11
 S. Karim, W. Mitchell, “ Path Dependent and Path Breaking Change: Reconfiguring Business Resources 
Following Acquisitions in the US Medical Sector “, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 21, 2000, p1061-1081 
12
 A. Berle, G. Means, “ The Modern Corporation and Private Property “, New York: Macmillan, 1932 
13
 M. Jensen, W. Meckling, “ Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure “, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 3, 1976, p305-360 
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destroy shareholder value. This divergence between shareholder and managerial interest 
represents the agency cost to the shareholders. More or less the same concept of agency 
costs can be applied to debt. Here the creditors are the principals. As compared to equity 
holders, which appoint the board of directors, which in turn nominees executive 
management, debt holders have less direct control over the agent. However they have 
stronger, legally enforceable contracts and can ultimately force the creditor to insolvency or 
liquidation. Corporate governance and the external market for corporate control are effective 
tools to prevent or at least decrease the agency problem. The external market for corporate 
control may be seen as the last solution, when internal corporate governance has failed. 
2.1.4. Managerial Perspective 
The managerial perspective on mergers is closely tied to the agency model of the firm. The 
managerial motives have a great impact on the merger’s incidence, rationale, type, deal 
structure and outcome. As already mentioned managers may pursue different interest than 
their shareholders, maximizing their own interests. Shareholders can minimize this problem 
by devising appropriate incentive contracts, which align their interests with that of the 
manager. A prominent hypothesis in this context is the manager’s “ hubris “ by Richard Roll. 
Hubris implies that management of the acquiring company overestimate their capacity to 
create value out of acquisitions and additionally tend to overpay for them. Roll finds that as a 
consequence most acquisitions fail to create value for the acquiring shareholders. 
2.1.5. Organizational Perspective 
The organizational perspective on mergers considers a firm’s decision making process 
regarding the merger not completely rational but rather subject to several internal and 
external factors of political nature. Different stakeholders and actors within the firm each 
have different perspectives, expectations and motives regarding the merger. The complexity 
of the transaction requires a management approach, which also considers the organizational 
dynamics and human aspects of post merger integration. As compared to the other 
perspectives, it also takes the “soft facts” such as human relation issues etc… into account, 
which are also an essential part of the merger process. 
 
15 
2.2. Horizontal Mega Mergers 
Very large cross border acquisitions or mega mergers form the integral part of this paper. I 
focus on horizontal mergers, as they are the most common mergers. Sudarsanam14 defines 
horizontal mergers where firms selling the same products merge. However despite their 
recent popularity there still is a significant lack of scientific research on this topic. Strangely 
enough, although frequently used in the media, there exists no precise definition for mega 
mergers. Therefore I will try to define the term for my purposes and relate it to existing 
literature and empirical evidence. In my understanding mega mergers can be referred to very 
large M&A transactions with overall deal volume often adding up to billions of dollars. Of 
course such transactions may occur domestically especially in the U.S.  but more recently 
there is increased cross border activity, which is not surprising considering global 
consolidation in several industries. The main industries where mega mergers have occurred 
during the past 10 years are telecommunications, automobile, entertainment, financial 
services, consumer goods, oil and pharmaceutical. In this context mega mergers are often 
related to industry wide consolidation and can be seen as a response to more globalization 
and concentration. Thus this development implies that there will only be a few key players 
left in each industry. Ghemawat and Ghadar15 say that if firms want to be among the winners, 
they will have to shore up economies of scale in manufacturing, branding and R&D. They 
further add that from this perspective, cross border mergers are do or die propositions. 
Considering the complexity of cross border mega mergers and the fact that  already 50% of 
normal mergers fail, firms better think twice before committing a merger. In the following 
chapters I try to elaborate an insight on horizontal mega mergers and their value creation 
potential. In reference to the literature on or related to this topic I highlight the crucial factors 
in determining the success or failure of such transaction and the impact on value creation. 
Furthermore I provide performance measures of value creation and limited empirical 
evidence on large cross border transactions.  Finally I demonstrate the implementation of two 
horizontal cross border mega mergers upon a practical case study based on the Daimler 
Chrysler and Renault Nissan merger. 
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 Sudi Sudarsanam, “Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions – The Challenges “, Prentice Hall 
International, 2003, p97 
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 P. Ghemawat, F. Ghadar, “ The Dubious Logic of Global Mega Mergers “, Harvard Business Review, July- 
August 2000, p65 
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Large Cross Border M&A 
Sudarsanam16 registers a substantial increase in cross border M&A in recent years. 
Considering the nineties merger wave CBMAs with deal values of over USD 1 billion 
increased from 14 in 1987, representing 40% of all CBMAs, to 109 in 1999, representing 
70% of all CBMAs with a total estimated deal volume of USD 501 billions. He finds that the 
strategic considerations for cross border transactions often differ from purely domestic 
transactions. CBMAs are much more complex, which is based on differences in the political 
and economic environment, corporate organization, culture, tradition and tax, law and 
accounting rules. These difficulties have to be accounted for when considering an overseas 
transaction. Very large cross border transactions additionally have the size component, 
which aggravates the previously mentioned difficulties. In this context mega mergers are 
even more complex, due to the sheer size of both firms and the resources necessary to 
guarantee the implementation of the merger. What also comes into play with large size 
transactions is the increased attention of internal media and the investor’s community. Under 
these circumstances one might think that CBMAs are more prone to failure, in fact the 
empirical evidence is mixed.. Apart from the company specific factors, which drive firms to 
undertake CBMA, Sudarsanam17 describes the most essential economic forces in play. I 
thereby pick the ones that I believe are most applicable to cross border mega mergers: 
 
 The establishment of the EU as single market, the introduction of the European 
Monetary Union and with it the perception of many European companies that the EU 
is their home market 
 Globalization of product and service goods markets, increasing consumer needs, 
preferences and tastes creating demand and supply of goods and services originating 
in different countries 
 Increased global competition, with large firms competing on world markets 
 Increased pressure from technological progress only possible through massive 
investments in R&D, design, marketing and distributions. In order to recover these 
huge expenses, firms have to sell to the largest possible market – thus globalization, 
e.g. automobiles ( see Daimler Chrysler case study ) 
 Availability of capital to finance these acquisitions through debt and equity financing 
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 Privatization of state enterprises especially in Europe; e.g. in power, gas, 
telecommunications etc.. 
 More benign and less hostile attitude to foreign ownership of national corporations 
partly induced by economic crisis and need for corporate restructuring; e.g. banking 
or automobile industry in Japan18 ( see Renault Nissan case study ) 
 
Having mentioned the economic forces influencing CBMAs I now focus on the internal 
motivation of a firm to seek expansion beyond domestic boundaries. There are numerous 
theories drawn from a wide range of disciplines such as industrial/ organizational economics, 
competitive strategy models, finance theory etc.. Dunning19 has developed a comprehensive 
model with respect to the decision process in CBMAs. He distinguishes three evaluation 
stages. The first stage is based upon the question whether or not the firm has certain 
competitive advantages that can be exploited to create value through the foreign production 
decision ( Ownership Decision ). The second question is whether or not the foreign location 
for production is superior to the acquirers domestic location and subsequent export to 
overseas markets ( Location Decision ). The third question is whether foreign production 
should be carried out under ownership and organizational control of the firm or through 
alternative modes such as licensing or strategic alliance ( Internalization ) decision. The 
model also referred to as the OLI model tries to simplify the entry mode decision. There are 
several other factors for the choice of entry mode, which come into play and are not captured 
by the OLI model. Harzing20 finds such factors as the firm’s international business strategy, 
its experience of the political, economic, regulatory, institutional, and cultural aspects of the 
host country. Overall CBMAs present an interesting opportunity to enter new markets but 
they definitely come at a high price. The sources and boundaries to value creation especially 
related to cross border transactions will be treated in more detail later on. However there are 
other ways to grow outside the home country, which in some cases make more sense. The 
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2.3. Strategic Alliances as an Alternative to M&A 
Sudarsanam21 notes that M&A often fail to deliver the desired results, thus firms try 
alternative means to reach the same objectives. In recent years strategic alliances have 
become increasingly popular as they spare the costs of an outright acquisition and are more 
flexible compared to M&A. They can take a variety of forms ranging from simple purchase 
and sale agreements to the creation of complex legally distinct entities ( e.g Joint Ventures 
etc.. ). Dussauge, Garrett and Mitchell22 define strategic alliances as an arrangement 
between two or more independent companies that choose to carry out a project or operate in 
a specific business area by coordinating the necessary skills and resources jointly rather 
than operating on their own or merging their operations. The motivations for strategic 
alliances are similar to that of M&A mainly cost reductions, technology sharing, product 
development, market access and access to capital. A diligently planned strategic alliance can 
be a less expensive alternative to a merger and still achieve the same goal. Despite that 
strategic alliances also have critical elements and barriers to be overcome. Regarding the 
economic logic of strategic alliances Doz and Hamel23 identify two strategic imperatives; 
“racing for the world” and “racing for the future”. “Racing for the world” implies that a firm 
attempts to draw a maximum of extant global opportunities, which it can not achieve alone 
and thus forms an alliance. A firm “ racing for the future” aims to create new products, skills, 
resources and competencies with the alliance partner. Both approaches have in common 
that they are motivated by gaining competitive capabilities through cooperation; leveraging 
each other’s co-specialized resources; and gaining competence through internalized learning 
from each other. Koza and Lewin24 take a similar approach and define two basic motivations: 
exploitative and exploratory. Similar to “racing for the world” exploitative alliances seek to 
leverage partner resources and capabilities to enhance revenues or reduce costs. The 
exploratory alliance similar to “racing for the future“ aims to create new opportunities, 
resources, markets, products and technologies. Based on these two core motives Koza and 
Lewin formulate three basic kinds of strategic alliances: 
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 Learning Alliances: 
In learning alliances the partners primarily have an exploration intent. Such alliances 
can be about markets, core competencies or technologies. 
 
 Business Alliances: 
The primary goal being exploitation the most common objective is revenue 
enhancement. Such alliances are typically structured as equity Joint Ventures 
 
 Hybrid Alliances: 
Hybrid Alliances combine both elements exploitative and exploratory. Partners seek 
to simultaneously maximize opportunities from leveraging existing capabilities and 
assets as well as new value creation through mutual learning. 
 
The case study of Renault and Nissan will provide a practical insight on these motives. 
Important to note is that the economic and strategic rationale behind the alliance determines 
its legal form, management and organizational structure.  
Despite the advantages of strategic alliances there also exist potential risk factors. According 
to Sudarsanam the most important risk factor are diverging strategies among alliance 
partners, since the future evolution of alliances are sometimes uncertain and hard to predict. 
Such problems might arise when one partner has fully exploited the learning potential and 
thus has an incentive to leave the alliance. Koza and Lewin25 support this notion by 
identifying the root cause of alliance failure to be the failure to grasp and articulate its 
strategic intent, followed by the lack of recognition of the close interplay between the overall 
strategy of the company and the role of the alliance in that strategy. Another potential risk is 
to become too dependent on the alliance partner. This becomes especially problematic when 
the alliance partner goes out of business or wants to pursue new relationship. In this context 
Case, Lee and Martin26 find that alliance partners, especially in the case of Joint Ventures, 
run the risk of value losses ( in terms of competences and know –how ) when one partner 
becomes a takeover target. It should have become clear that M&A and strategic alliances 
share several similarities and can often be seen as alternative ways to achieve the same 
strategic goals. The main advantage of alliances lies in reduced cost and risk. Additionally as 
compared to M&A with an alliance partners have the possibility to selectively access only 
certain target capabilities. M&A on the other hand are not as prone to diverging management 
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styles, corporate strategy and corporate culture. Where a firm wants to protect its own 
competencies from being copied by alliance partners or prefers to throw a proprietary ring 
fence around future developments of competitive advantages and wants to ensure the long 
term commitment of the partner, an M&A should be preferred to an alliance. 
 
3. Value Creation in Horizontal Mega Mergers 
Value Creation in horizontal mega merger depends on a multitude of factors, many of them 
sharing the same rationale that applies to normal mergers. However there are certain factors 
which should be considered in more detail and be especially related to mega mergers. This 
chapter will start with the sources and limits for value creation in horizontal mega mergers, 
followed by drivers of value creation especially with respect to mega mergers. Since there is 
no empirical study exclusively focusing on mega mergers I will apply findings from studies, 
which have a similar focus on large transactions. Where appropriate I will support my 
argumentation with empirical findings and further provide a short overview of possible 
measures for value creation in this context. 
3.1. Sources and Limits to Value Creation in Horizontal Mega Mergers 
According to Sudarsanam27 horizontal mergers often characterize industries and markets 
whose products are in the mature or declining stages of the product life cycle. In most cases 
there is only a small number of large competitors and the growth rates in these markets are 
relatively low, which are often related to excess capacity, and thus encourages firms to either 
find new ways to growth or to achieve cost efficiencies through consolidation. Such cost 
efficiencies may be achieved through the already mentioned economies of scale, scope and 
learning. This framework also and perhaps even to a greater degree applies to mega 
mergers. I believe that this especially accounts to mega mergers as the required financial 
strength for such transactions will most likely be the case in mature industries with sufficient 
cash reserves and asset base. With respect to cross border M&A only large multinational 
firms have the resources and capabilities to operate on a global level, which already poses a 
certain pre condition on firm size. The main sources for value creation within this framework 
can be divided into three basic categories: 
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 Revenue Enhancement:  
Either through increased market power; Network externalities, where network 
externalities exist when the value of a product to the individual customer depends on 
the number of other users of the product; and the leveraging of each others 
marketing resources and capabilities 
 
 Cost Savings: 
Cost savings from the reduction of excess capacity; Scale and Scope economies in 
production, marketing, sales and distribution, branding, R&D and logistics; Learning 
economies 
 
 New Growth Opportunities: 
Creation of new capabilities and resources, products, markets and processes   
 
Apart from these categories there is another main source of value creation coming from the 
resource based view. A successful redeployment of the firm’s resources and capabilities can 
be the main source for long term value creation but also is the hardest to achieve. Synergies 
and certain cost reductions from scale and scope may only be achieved through 
redeployment. Capron et al28 invested 253 horizontal mergers in the US and Europe between 
1988 and 1992. Their findings imply that the most commonly redeployed resources and 
capabilities concern R&D, manufacturing ( e.g. production cost structure ), marketing ( brand 
management, distribution channels etc .. ), managerial ( management skills )  and financial 
resources. Their findings further indicate that on average the acquirer redeploys more 
resources and capabilities than the target. Transfers of specialized resources such as 
transfers in R&D and manufacturing are more similar in magnitude between acquirer and 
target than transfers of generalized resources such as managerial and financial. 
 
The limits and barriers to value creation in horizontal mega mergers are manifold and often 
case dependent. In order to provide a suitable framework for the case studies I will 
concentrate on the specific barriers to cross border transactions, which concern the majority 
of mega mergers in general and especially those outside the US. Sudarsanam29 identifies 
four dimensions regarding barriers to foreign transactions: 
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 Structural Barriers: 
Structural barriers mainly concern differences in the statutory and regulatory 
environment. Statutory problems may arise with respect to different governing bodies 
or the role of workers unions etc…Regulatory issues mainly concern antitrust 
regulations and rules of stock exchange and professional self-regulatory bodies 
 
 Technical Barriers: 
Technical barriers concern managerial issues such as problems related to the 
removal of two-tier boards, share restrictions or shares with differential voting rights 
etc.. 
 
 Information Barriers: 
Related to information asymmetries in accounting information and compliance of 
accounting rules. Regulatory procedures may also be unknown or unpredictable 
 
 Culture and Tradition: 
A very important but often underestimated issue which will be treated in more detail 
later on. I find that the most common problems are related to the general resistance 
to M&A especially among target employees, differences in compensation and overall 
business culture 
3.2. Key Drivers for Value Creation in Horizontal Mega Mergers 
This chapter highlights specific factors, which seem to have a big impact on value creation. 
The information is drawn from various sources and should thus capture the most common 
drivers for value creation, however this is not a recipe for success applicable to any mega 
merger. Some of the findings were based on two empirical studies, which most likely meet 
the size requirements of mega mergers and should thus provide useful information. The first 
study from Sirower and Sahni30 consists of a sample of 302 deals announced between July 
1995 and August 2001 with an average acquirer market cap. of USD 14.2 billion and average 
target market cap. of USD 5.5 billion. The second study by Hazelkorn, Zenner and 
Shivdasani31 uses a sample of 1547 deals over the period from January 1990 to January 
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2002. The sample concerned foreign and domestic acquisitions of US acquirers with a 
minimum transaction value of USD 250 mn. representing at least 5% of the acquirers 
enterprise value. I still include findings from other studies, which do not meet the size 
criterion, but which I believe also account for mega mergers. 
3.2.1. Delivering Results after a Good Start Pays Off 
Sirower and Sahni32 find that deals that are perceived positively by investors and meet the 
projected objectives in the beginning, in the long run significantly outperform deals that start 
of poorly. In the year following the announcement, acquirers whose deals were met initially 
with a negative investor reaction, and continued to be perceived negatively, had an average 
return of -24,9% whereas deals with a favorable response returned an average return of 
33.1%. This implies that early significant performance wins signal to the market that the 
acquirer has a trackable plan. This information is rewarded by the shareholders and thus 
creates additional value. 
3.2.2. Acquisition Premiums 
An important determinant of merger success or failure is the amount of acquisition premium, 
since high premiums present a considerable financial burden, which in some cases are 
hardly recoverable by cost savings and revenue enhancements. In Sirower’s and Sahni’s33 
sample the average premium amounted to 36%. The initially negative group paid an average 
premium of 38.4% and the positive group paid 30.7%. Basically the same finding was intact 
one year after the transaction. This finding is also true for the long run with the persistent 
negative performers having paid an acquisition premium of 40.5% and the persistent positive 
performers only having paid 25.8%. Thus acquisition premiums have a significant impact on 
value creation. 
3.2.3. Financing Structure 
The Impact of the financing structure is highlighted in both studies and further reaffirmed by 
numerous sources in M&A literature. The finding is that cash deals although less common 
clearly outperform stock financed deals. Hazelkorn et al34 find that the short term impact is 
moderate with a median short term excess return of 0.9% in cash financed deals compared 
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to -1.9% for stock transactions. The true impact is revealed in the long term, where within two 
years cash financed acquirers outperform their industry peers by 4.3% while stock financed 
acquirers underperform their peers by -5.2%. These findings are also consistent with Sirower 
and Sahni35. Cash acquisitions are perceived more favorably for several reasons. Hazelkorn 
et al36 find that a cash acquisition signals the acquirer’s confidence to replenish its cash 
balance. Cash acquisitions often involve issuing of debt, thus the resulting pressure to repay 
the debt puts a significant incentive to closely manage the integration process and thus 
encourage the realization of synergies. Another common finding is that stock financed 
acquisitions provide an incentive for acquirers with an overvalued stock price to pay for the 
acquisition in equity. This is consistent with the finding of Sudarsanam and Mahate37. 
3.2.4. Foreign vs. Domestic Acquisitions 
The sample of Hazelkorn et al38 suggests that foreign acquisitions create more value than 
domestic acquisitions, this is at least the case for US acquirers. The short term excess return 
was 0.8% for foreign acquisitions compared to -0.6% for domestic acquisitions. The median 
long term excess return for foreign acquisitions amounted to 8.4%. Despite the increased 
complexity especially regarding cultural, social and post merger integration issues, foreign 
acquisitions created more value in this sample. The general opinion on this factor is mixed as 
other sources suggest that it is more beneficial to stick to the home market. 
3.2.5. Removing Overcapacity in Mature Industries 
According to Mamdani and Noah39 the removal of excess capacities in mature industries is a 
key value driver. Within such a framework especially cost savings but also other synergies 
may be achieved more easily. I think that this factor has in fact had a great impact on several 
mega deals, while the ones that effectively rationalized their operations following the merger 
were able to create sustainable value. 
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3.2.6. Purchasing R&D and New Technology Platforms 
Mamdani and Noah40 believe that mergers are an effective tool to purchase new 
technologies and gain access to new sources of R&D. In my opinion if firms are able to 
integrate and consequently redeploy these resources and capabilities they will likely create 
sustainable value. The question is if such new technologies can not be achieved otherwise 
e.g. through internal R&D. In my opinion especially the past mega mergers in the 
pharmaceutical industry were partly inspired by this rationale. 
3.2.7. Post Merger Integration 
In my view effective post merger integration ( PMI ) probably has the greatest impact on 
sustainable long term value creation. This is especially true for cross border transactions as 
the cultural differences are an additional integrative barrier. Norburn and Schoenberg41 find 
that 90% of all acquisitions rated as not meeting their original objectives experienced major 
unforeseen difficulties in respect to cultural differences. Although the issue is addressed in 
most of the literature, there is only very little research actually focusing on PMI. 
Harbeck,Kröger and Träm42 elaborated rules for successful PMI based on a global survey 
conducted by A.T. Kearney. The survey respondents, mainly consisting of top executives 
from large multinationals, were asked to identify from three phases ( phase 1: strategy 
development and due diligence; phase 2: negotiation and closing; phase 3: PMI ) the one 
with the greatest failure risk. Interestingly 53% of respondents stated that PMI bears the 
greatest failure risk, followed by 30% for phase 1 and 17% for phase 2. The rules for 
successful post merger integration are as follows: 
 
 Vision: 
 Merger partners often lack a clear strategy of what the merger is up to. Cost savings 
and synergies are the most common response and are often rewarded by the stock 
market with short term gains. In order to achieve long term value creation a sound 
strategy is imperative. Only very few mergers combine both aspects and have a 
proper emphasis on the later 
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 Leadership: 
The issue of leadership is a delicate one and firms tend to be slow in assigning it. The 
result is chaos which degenerates into the survival of the fittest. This wastes time and 
resources but more importantly creates uncertainty and demotivation among the 
workforce 
 
 Growth:  
Firm still consider growth to be an overriding merger rationale but focus too much on 
cost synergies. While being successful in the short term, after a while firms tend to 
switch back to the accustomed operating mode before the merger in the long run and 
disregard the objective or growth 
 
 Early Wins: 
Firms often overestimate the willingness of the workforce to buy into the merger as 
soon as it is announced. It is very likely that the workforces of both firms will initially 
reject the merger. Thus buy-in can not be assumed, it has to be earned. If early wins 
– such as quick, positive and tangible results – are achieved and communicated 
properly, people will respect the progress and change to a more favorable attitude 
 
 Culture:  
Firms tend to neglect that cultural barriers exist and that it takes considerable time to 
break them down. This is especially true for cross border transactions but also 




Despite the placement of communication managers to enhance integration, the taken 
measures are often insufficient. Active involvement is essential to create a sense of 
fair play and openness. 
 
 Risk Management: 
Despite the numerous risks related to mergers, only very few firms consider and 




Morosini43 mainly concentrates on the social aspects of PMI. He promotes the fast 
establishment of a connective tissue between the joining firms. This tissue will be dependent 
on the desired form of merger. It will be a lot closer to the acquirers organizational tissue in 
the case of consolidating acquisitions, whereas it will be a substantially new corporate tissue 
in the case of a merger of equals. Morosini stresses that it is important to build such a 
corporate tissue as fast as possible. S. Nakamura44 has come up with a model reflecting the 
different stages of post merger integration until such a common corporate tissue is finally 
realized or remains unachievable and thus most likely results in a failure: 
 
Figure 1: The Different Stages of Post Merger Integration 
 
Source: S. Nakamura, “ Reflections on the Importance of Cross Cultural Management Strategy for 
Companies Promoting Globalization “  
 
As one can see in the graph PMI is a complex process, which can hardly be implemented at 
once. It takes considerable effort, willingness and sacrifice to make PMI happen. In order to 
encourage successful PMI and the creation of the previously mentioned corporate tissue, the 
exchange of existing and the development of new social capabilities and a common stock of 
organizational knowledge is necessary. In this context Morosini defines five key social 
capabilities, which are very similar to the rules of successful PMI by Harbeck et al.. 
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3.3. Practical Guidance on Pre Merger Evaluation, Performance Measures and 
Empirical Findings 
3.3.1. Pre Merger Evaluation 
Sirower and Sahni45 specially investigate expected synergies and their impact on value 
creation for shareholders. This is not surprising since most of the firms justify the merger 
decision with synergies. In this context the common belief is that the paid premium will be 
recovered by the expected synergies. The purchase price of an acquisition is often 
determined by the pricing of other comparable acquisitions rather than a diligent assessment 
of the true price, taking into account where, when and how management may drive real 
performance gains. Sirower and Sahni46 thus have come up with a simple tool to assess the 
relative magnitude of synergy risk referred to as shareholder value at risk ( SVAR ). SVAR is 
calculated by the premium paid for the acquisition divided by the market value of the 
acquiring company prior to announcement. In simple terms SVAR indicates how much of the 
firm’s value is at risk in case no synergies are realized. Thus the higher the index the higher 
the SVAR. Acquirers may loose even more than the premium, in this case SVAR 
underestimates risk. When applying SVAR one also has to account for the difference in 
method of payment. The main difference is that in cash transactions, the acquiring 
shareholders take on the entire risk of a shortfall in synergies and consequently the loss of 
the acquisition premium. In stock transactions that risk is also spread among shareholders of 
the target. It is not surprising that many acquisitions have been paid in stock. But there is a 
big catch to it, which some investors will be aware of. As already pointed out the best time to 
issue new shares for example to finance an acquisition is when they are overvalued. Further 
more if the management of the acquirer were truly confident about the merger, why would 
they share their future benefits by paying with stock. Thus to wary investors paying with stock 
is a signal of lower confidence than if a deal was financed with cash.  
On the basis of SVAR Sirower and Sahni present a simple earnings model for the target, 
which captures a combination of cost savings ( cost synergies ) and revenue enhancements 
( revenue synergies ) that would justify a given premium. This does not replace a proper DCF 
valuation but provides a practical approach to assess a merger decision. This approach also 
allows for a sanity check of the post merger integration business plan. 
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3.3.2. Performance Measures 
Cartwright and Schoenberg47 state that the selection of appropriate performance metrics is of 
particular relevance in inter-disciplinary fields such as mergers and acquisitions, where 
diverse origins have led to the adoption of a broad range of performance measures within 
contemporary research. I find that the most common performance measures for assessing 
value creation in normal and mega mergers are based on financial measures such as excess 
stock returns also referred to as cumulative abnormal returns ( see Hazelkorn et al, Sirower 
and Sahni etc.. ), EPS growth and accounting performance. While these performance 
measures are rather objective, Schoenberg also examines the use of subjective performance 
measures, such as management self reports, especially when considering value creation in 
mergers from an organizational or strategic management perspective: 
 
 Managers’ Subjective Assessments: 
Executives are asked to rate the extent to which organizational objectives behind the 
acquisition have been reached along specified dimensions. Additionally the managers 
are continuously asked to rate their satisfaction with overall acquisition performance 
to establish convergent validity ( See also Dess and Robinson48 ). Brock49 further 
includes the view of the acquired firm’s executives. The data is usually gathered three 
to five years after the acquisition and thus provides an ex-post assessment. The main 
advantage of this measure is that it allows for a composite view of the transaction and 
that it can be applied to any transaction and also when there are no objective 
measures available. The main drawback, as noted by Lubatkin and Shrieves50, is the 
fact that it can be subject to managerial bias and that it is dependent upon accurate 
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 Expert Informants’ Subjective Assessment:  
A variant of the above based on an expert opinion. As Haywood52 finds experts 
typically rely on direct data from stock market analysts or as Datta and Grant53 find 
from secondary information from financial press reports and commentaries. This 




Montgomery and Wilson test whether acquired firms have been divested following an 
acquisition, thus expressing management’s dissatisfaction with the acquisition 
performance.  As Porter54 notes the underlying assumption is that firms are very 
unlikely to close down successful businesses except in very few distinct cases. 
Divestment is a very simple measure with low information requirements. However 
divestments may also indicate profit taking from successful restructuring ( See 
Kaplan and Weisbach55 ) or as Capron et al56 point out an appropriate resource 
configuration in response to environmental changes 
3.3.3. Empirical Findings 
This section provides an overview of empirical findings drawn from various sources. The 
majority of the findings are consistent with the literature although there are some interesting 
outliers. The following subsection presents empirical findings regarding the direct impact of 
transaction size on value creation, which is a central question of the thesis. The evidence 
however is mixed, which should provide an incentive for further research. 
3.3.3.1. Mixed Evidence on Transaction Size  
Hazelkorn et al.57 investigate the impact of transaction size on value creation and find that in 
their study there is a small but statistically significant relationship between transaction size 
and short term performance, where large transactions underperform smaller transactions. 
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However there is no statistic evidence that the same is true for the long term. Another 
interesting aspect in this respect is the relative deal size, meaning the size of the deal in 
proportion to the size of the company. Contrary to expectations Bieshaar et al.58 find that 
relative deal size does not matter. This is surprising because one might expect that a big 
deal can create greater synergies. Bieshaar argues that the market is already skeptical about 
the value creation potential in M&A and thus compensates the greater risk of value 
destruction for the greater potential synergies of a large deal. A more recent report by BCG 
contradicts with the findings of Hazelkorn et al. and Bieshaar et al.. The report is based on a 
sample of 3,190 M&A transactions during the period of 1992 to 2006. In the report K. Cools 
et al.59 note that large deals above USD 1 bn. nearly destroy twice as much value as smaller 
transactions below USD 1 bn.. They believe that this reflects the increased difficulties with 
integrating large targets. Regarding relative transaction size, the sample indicates that deals 
destroy significantly more value as the size of the target increases relative to the acquirer. 
Targets representing more than 50% of the acquirer destroy almost twice as much value as 
targets that are less than 10% of the acquirer, as is indicated in the graph below. 
 
Figure 2: Relative Transaction Size 
 
 Source: K. Cools, J. Gell, J. Kengelbach, A. Roos, “ The Brave New World of M&A: How to Create Value From Mergers and 
Acquisitions “, Boston Consulting Group, July 2007, p 19 
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Only Few Mega Mergers Create Additional Shareholder Value. Based on a study by 
Accenture on the twenty largest global mergers during the period from 1998 to 2004, Nunes 
and Breene60 compare pre and post merger shareholder returns. Pre merger returns are the 
annual return of acquirer shareholders above the industry index three years prior to the 
merger. The post merger returns represent the average annual returns for shareholders of 
the merged firm three years after the merger. As the graph below indicates during this 
specific period and as for this sample, most mega mergers were not able to exceed the pre 
merger shareholder returns, which implies that the mergers did not create additional value at 
least from a shareholder point of view. However I believe that the post merger time frame of 
three years might be too short as the implementation especially in large transactions takes 
considerably more time and thus I believe that it might take longer for mega mergers to 
effectively translate value creation into shareholder returns. 
 
Figure 3: Shareholder Value Creation in Mega Mergers 
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3.3.3.2. Other Empirical Findings Related to Value Creation 
 
 Acquirer shareholders loose: Both studies confirmed that on average shareholders of 
the acquiring firm loose especially around announcement. Sirower and Sahni find that 
the average return to shareholders of the acquiring firm is -  4.1% with 64% of deals 
perceived negatively and a positive market response of 36% of deals. One year later 
shareholder returns are almost identical with -4.3% and 61% of acquiring firms 
lagging their industry peers. What is also consistent with most M&A studies is the 
wide variance of returns. Around announcement acquirer returns range from         - 
40.1 % to 26.1% and more significantly for the one year period from – 151% to 
281.5%. Interestingly in the study by Hazelkorn et al acquirer shareholder only loose -
0.5 to - 0.7% around announcement. They further find that during the period of two 
years after announcement acquirer shareholders actually gain 0.5%, however there 
are large fluctuations in the longer run. While the first study by Sirower and Sahni 
seems to be consistent with most other studies, Hazelkorn et al. have somewhat 
surprising results. Due to the fact that the acquisition volume in Hazelkorn et al. was 
significantly lower than in Sirower and Sahni’s study one could conclude that the 
larger the transaction, the more critical the shareholders reaction. However I believe 
that this is not the case here, although further investigation in that direction would be 
valuable for future studies 
 
 Target shareholders win: In Sirower and Sahni’s study sellers realized an average 
return of 20% from the week before deal announcement to the week after. This 
finding is consistent with almost any M&A study. For example Goergen and 
Renneboog61 find an immediate abnormal return of 9% upon announcement and 23% 
from two months before the announcement till announcement day 
 
 Initial Reactions Are Persistent: Sirower and Sahni’s study reveals that most initial 
reactions tend to be persistent over time and are thus indicative of future returns. 
Deals that started off with a negative reaction ( - 9.2% ) almost remained the same 
negative return one year after ( -9.0% ). The same accounts for positive perfomers 
with an initial reaction of 5.7% and a positive return of 4.9% after one year. 67% of all 
negatively perceived deals were still negative after a years while only 50% of positive 
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deals remained positive. Thus a goof start does not guarantee long term success but 
a bad start is even harder to reverse 
 
 Method of Payment Matters: As already pointed out in the section on value drivers, 
there is a significant difference between a payment in equity, cash or a combination 
of both. This finding is also consistent with the vast majority of studies 
 
 Cross Border M&A Underperforms Domestic M&A : The majority of empirical 
evidence suggests that Cross Border Acquisitions are more risky and create less 
value.  R. Schoenberg62 for example finds that cross border M&A significantly 
underperform domestic M&A, with neutral to highly unsatisfactory outcome for cross 
border transactions in 54% of all cases compared to only 39% for domestic 
transactions. This result confirms earlier findings of a study based on shareholder 
abnormal returns from Aw and Chatterjee63 and is consistent with the overall 
empirical evidence 
 
 Sales Growth as the Main Determinant for Superior Value Creation: A recent BCG 
report64 on the main sources for Total Shareholder Return identified sales growth as 
the most important and sustainable factor in value creation. The study used a sample 
of the top performers of S&P 500 over a rolling period of one, three, five and ten 
years from 1987 through 2005. It should be noted that significant value creation will 
only occur under the smooth interaction of growth and the other dimensions of value 
creation. There are to ways to achieve sales growth either through organic growth or 
through M&A. In this context another BCG study65 based on a sample of the stock 
market performance of 705 US companies during 1993 and 2002, finds that 
acquisitive growth clearly creates the most value. The sample was divided into three 
groups with highly acquisitive, mixed and organic growth strategy. Firms pursuing 
highly acquisitive strategies clearly outperformed the others with respect to value 
creation. Thus for me it comes intuitively that M&A especially for large companies in 
mature industries provides the more appealing solution than organic growth, as in 
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many cases it comes at a lower overall cost. Additionally according to the empirical 
evidence provided by BCG, firms capable of performing and implementing M&A seem 
to be the most persistent value creators 
 
 The number of mega mergers is significantly increasing: According to a Boston 
Consulting Group ( “BCG“) report on M&A, K. Cools et al66 find that the average value 
of deal has almost doubled to USD 110 mn. since 2002, which is almost at the all 
time record level of USD 140 mn. in 2000. This translates to a compound annual 
growth rate of 20% for the period of 2002 to 2006. The number of mega mergers with 
a transaction size above USD 1 billion has an 18% compound annual growth rate. In 
2006 there were about 450 mega deals. K. Cools et al. partly relate the increasing 
size of deals to the strong trend towards consolidation and higher overall valuation 
levels. They further mention the beneficial environment of recent years such as low 
interest rates, high company profits and thus sufficient liquidity to finance acquisitions. 
The following graph depicts this development: 
 
Figure 4: Increase in Mega Mergers 
 
Source: K. Cools, J. Gell, J. Kengelbach, A. Roos, “ The Brave New World of M&A: How to Create Value From Mergers and 
Acquisitions “, Boston Consulting Group, July 2007, p 10 
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4. Case Study – Value Creation in Mega Mergers at the 
Example of Daimler Chrysler and Renault Nissan 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The auto industry provides a solid basis for analysis of consolidation as it is a very large – it 
accounts for up to 7% of the national income of developed countries - , capital and labor 
intensive industry, which is prone to the economic situation of various geographic regions 
around the globe. Consolidation may be achieved through several means, either through 
some form of limited cooperation as in alliance or mergers and acquisitions, with the latter 
being the main focus of this study. All forms of consolidation share a common feature, which 
is relinquishing autonomy or control in exchange for resources ( such as new products, R&D, 
new market entry in formerly unexploited regions etc..), which are more costly to acquire in 
the absence of cooperation. The motivations behind consolidation and especially M&A are 
manifold and dependent on the single firm’s competitive situation. However the following 
section tries to come up with an explanation of the rational behind M&A and alliances in the 
automotive industry. I will concentrate on the latest phase of consolidation in the late 90s, 
which has led to an unprecedented wave of mergers. As I have already outlined in the 
theoretical section, the car industry was among those industries which saw intensive 
consolidation. I chose two prominent cases for deeper analysis namely that of Daimler 
Chrysler and Renault Nissan. On the basis of these two I will try to elaborate and 
demonstrate the main factors and motivations behind the merger/alliance, the actual 
enforcement and long term implementation, and ultimately test whether the outcome has 
created or destroyed overall corporate value. From a retrospective view I find that Daimler 
Chrysler can be considered as a rather poor merger, which is consistent with the empirical 
evidence of M&A that about 50% of all mergers fail, whereas Renault Nissan is a shining 
example of value creation.  
The Automotive Industry in the Late 90’s 
In his book “ Merging Traffic “ John A.C. Conybeare67 addresses the situation of the 
automotive industry during the late nineties and in this context the arrival of yet another 
consolidation wave. This book provided the basis for the following chapter. During the 
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nineties about a dozen auto manufacturers have emerged to global players regarding 
geographic reach and size necessary to operate on a multinational level.  
 
The Three big players in the U.S are GM, Ford and Chrysler, each of them already operating 
beyond their original boundaries. The concentration among U.S car manufacturers has 
experienced a significant increase since the end of World War 2. According to Conybeare68 
by 1920 there were as many as 169 car manufacturers in the U.S, however this number 
decreased to only three big manufacturers in 1960. Since then the situation has not much 
changed as we can still see the three main players on the market.   
 
The situation was very similar in Europe, where for example the number of car 
manufacturers in Britain decreased from 200 in 1913 to one single government subsidized 
multibrand conglomerate British Leyland, comprising Britain’s greatest car brands. Being 
unable to compete, due to low productivity and several other reasons, British Leyland was 
renamed to Rover and most of the conglomerates assets were either privatized or sold, with 
some of the most valuable brands such as Jaguar being sold to Ford and other 
manufacturers. By the end of the nineties major volume production of vehicles had 
diminished in the U.K leaving only very few niche market players behind. 
In Germany, a country famous for its unique engineering skills, industry concentration was 
always high, which is probably due to its rather cartelistic industrial structure and the 
prevalence of bank financing, which can be considered rather discriminating to small firms. 
By the nineties there were two major volume producers Daimler and VW. BMW as a medium 
volume producer with slightly more than 1 million vehicles per year had established itself as a 
profitable premium producer.   
France as an early entrant to high volume production had also seen a significant increase in 
concentration where most of the small companies have been integrated to the remaining two 
large volume manufacturers Renault and Peugeot-Citroen ( PSA ).  
In Italy most post war companies have been integrated to industrial conglomerate Fiat, which 
derived the majority of its revenues from car and car related manufacturing ( 42% of group 
revenue ) and was Europe’s largest carmaker for several years. The group held exclusive 
brands such as Ferrari, Maserati and Lancia.  
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Japan with its unique organizational keiretsu form has always had a highly concentrated, 
rather oligopolisitc automotive industry with the main players being Toyota, Nissan, Honda 
and Mazda. I believe that similar to Germany the economic and political environment seems 
to have favored such an industry set up. The following table provides an overview of the 

































































Global Market Shares of Major Auto Manufacturers
 
Source: Renault Nissan ( based on production figures from CCFA, December 1998 ) 
 
Summarizing the history of the automotive industry, on can see a clear global tendency 
towards consolidation. While the first consolidation wave in the early 20th century was mainly 
driven by the economic perspective, thus economies of scale and scope, the merger wave of 
the late nineties can be seen as a combination of the economic perspective and the strategic 
perspective and in that respect especially the resource based view of competitive strategy. 
This trend peaked during the nineties pushing automotive groups to further grow and develop 
new resources and capabilities as a response to increased competition. According to 
Fujimoto and Heller69 from 1990 to 1998 the number of globally active manufacturers 
decreased from 27 to 20 through M&A. Heller, Fujimoto and Mercer70 find that the number of 
strategic alliances among American, European and Japanese firms increased from 36 to 
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102. They say that one of the main reasons for consolidation lies in the common belief 
among automakers that they have to reach a certain size in order to reach economies of 
scale. As stated in Conybeare’s book71 the minimum efficient economies of scale (MES) for a 
basic model ( platform ) are achieved with an annual output of 250.000 vehicles. Fujimoto 
and Heller assume that an internationally active car manufacturer should have at least four to 
five basic models ( platforms ) to cover the mass market, this amounts to an MES of 1 to 2 
million vehicles per year. Beyond this level further efficiency improvements can be rather 
related to the firm’s organizational capability than scale. The top 5 auto groups in the late 
nineties have already reached this barrier - Heller, Fujimoto and Mercer estimate that the top 
5 groups account for 60% of global sales - , which suggests that output growth alone could 
not have caused the rapid consolidation. In fact I think it was intensifying competition, caused 
by the customers growing demand for lower prices along with higher reliability, the 
introduction of environmental and safety standards and overall technical innovation. 
Competition did not only intensify on a level directly observable to the customers but further 
on the operational level for example productivity, lead times and process capabilities. This 
multitude of factors was necessary to capitalize on global opportunities and to retain 
competitive advantage. Fujimoto72 refers to this process as capability building competition. It 
was exactly this competition, which encouraged the big players to look beyond their existing 
organizational framework and to establish new ties with other industry players, be it through 
alliance or integration, in order to exchange productive, financial and managerial resources. 
Fujimoto73 has further defined capabilities as “stable patterns of firms productive resources 
and their activities which create inter-firm differences in organizational performance and are 
hard to imitate by competitors”. Foss74 describes capabilities as certain internal 
characteristics unique to a firm, in particular the distinctive abilities of a firm to compete, 
improve and survive.  It should be noted that such capabilities especially on the deeper firm 
level such as productivity may take decades to develop, thus the outcome of the high M&A 
activity in the late nineties might still be not observable today. Apart from the firms long term 
capabilities on a productive level, other long term strategic goals such as the entrance of new 
markets ( e.g China ) also came into play. 
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4.2. Advantages and Disadvantages Related to Size 
4.2.1. Advantages 
The following chapter addresses the main advantages and disadvantages related to the size 
of a firm particular in the car industry. I will approach the topic from a general perspective, 
meaning that the statements mentioned herein apply for both transactions Daimler Chrysler 
and Renault Nissan. 
 
 Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale are by far the most significant advantage when it comes to size, 
however the question is if an increase in scale translates into value creation. Nunes 
and Breene75 test the relationship between scale and value creation. They use capital 
growth as a proxy for scale and test whether increased capital growth also leads to 
an increase in market value. They took a sample of the 50 most capital growth 
intensive US firms during a period of seven years from 1997 to 2004. As the graph 
below indicates, out of the sample only few firms were able to keep their market 
value on pace with capital growth ( firms that are on or above the line ). Furthermore 
the firm s that grew their capital the most tended to be the ones with the least relative 
market value increase. 
 
Figure 6: Scale and Value Creation 
 
Source: Tim Breene Paul F. Nunes, “ Is Bigger Always Better “, Accenture Outlook 2004 Nr.3, p 23 
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 Increased Bargaining Power and Cost Savings 
According to Joseph F. Foudy76 a main advantage besides scale, which is directly 
related to increased size and does not only account for the car industry, is the 
increased bargaining power in procurement of parts and raw materials. With respect 
to mergers two formerly separate firms can pool their procurement and consequently 
drive down the purchasing price. In simple terms, the larger the firm the larger the 
discount it is able to negotiate. Furthermore the costs related to managing the 
procurement process are also likely to go down due to the overall reduction of firms 
with which the combined entity has to maintain relations with. Foudy77 further 
concludes that apart from discounts in procurement, a combination of businesses for 
the sake of creating a stand alone entity twice the size of the former two entities 
allows for significant cost savings through sharing of production factors.  In the car 
industry this would be parts and platform sharing between models. By sharing parts 
and platforms design and development costs are spread over more vehicles. In the 
case of Renault and Nissan, platform sharing was one of the main motivations behind 
the merger but it will be treated in more detail later on. Summarizing the above 
paragraph, the advantages of scale and scope are undeniable but the firms should 
also consider other factors especially if MES is already reached. 
 Diversification 
Foudy78 relates diversification as another main advantage to size. The global car 
industry is highly cyclical and it is often uncertain how a new model will be perceived 
by the market. Thus a globally positioned car group is better able to balance out 
losses in one world market with earnings in another one. The incentive of selling to 
the largest possible market represent a practical example of the previously 
mentioned economic force behind Cross Border M&A. 
 Less Exposure to Exchange Risks 
Yet another motivation to expand production facilities to key countries be it through 
organic growth or mergers and acquisitions, is lower exposure to currency swings. 
The ever faster technological progress of the industry and the need to adapt to new 
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technologies is coherent with exploding R&D budgets reaching billions of dollars 
annually. Foudy explains that it already is common practice to collaborate in these 
areas, since the necessary funds to develop for example fuel cells or hybrid engines 
could not be obtained otherwise. 
4.2.2. Disadvantages 
As I have already highlighted in the section on limits to value creation, mega mergers require 
more diligent planning than normal mergers in order to be successful. Apart from the 
massive consumption of monetary and managerial resources, one of the biggest challenges 
lies in the integration of the two entities especially concerning cross boarder mergers. 
 Post Merger Integration 
Mega mergers are more prone to integrative problems due to the fact that the bigger 
the entities, the more complex the integration process. Even in the presence of 
today’s communication technologies face to face contact is still crucial to establish a 
common basis for integration. If the two entities are situated thousands of kilometers 
apart from each other, forming this basis requires mutual effort. As we will see in the 
two cases, in one case there was a special emphasis on integration, whereas in the 
other case it seemed to be rather neglected. As the studies will demonstrate the 
integrative effort turned out to be a main source for value creation, which is also 
consistent with the findings of Habeck et al. ( see theoretical section on PMI ) as it is 
a precondition for the long term development of the merged entity. 
 Increased Public Attention and the Imperative of Revenue Growth 
Tim Breene and Paul F. Nune79 examined other factors which come into play when 
considering mega mergers and are often underestimated. Mega mergers are closely 
followed by international investors and shareholders of the merged entity have 
certain expectations to be met. The increasing importance of shareholders has 
changed the perception of an entity’s market value. The traditional operating 
performance criteria are surpressed by the investors’ expectations for future revenue 
growth. Such growth can hardly be achieved through organic growth, thus M&A might 
seem to be the only direct way to grow into an expectation-driven stock price. The 
objective to merge for revenue growth in order to satisfy shareholders’ expectations 
is a difficult task and often leads to the opposite. In fact an Accenture industry report 
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on the automotive industry by E. Cunningham et al.80 confirms this notion. In the 
report the authors determine the best performing auto manufacturers and find four 
key characteristics, which all performers have in common. One characteristic, which 
all successful performers have in common is that they grew by organic growth rather 
than by M&A. Thus I conclude that in the auto industry M&A as a tool for corporate 
growth is not always the optimal solution. 
 Diseconomies of Scale 
Tim Breene and Paul F. Nune81 highlight another problem which is often 
underestimated. They refer to it as diseconomies of scale. Diseconomies of scale 
implies that the advantages of scale can be outweighed by losses in flexibility, market 
responsiveness and employee engagement. Additionally large firms are often already 
well managed especially in mature industries. Referring to the real costs of merging, 
diseconomies often result from an overestimation of post merger efficiency and an 
underestimation of the total cost of merging. This problem has also been identified by 
Sirower and Sahni but from a different angle. As stated in the theoretical section 
Sirower and Sahni believe that high takeover premiums tend to destroy value as they 
can often not be recovered by the expected synergies ( see section on practical 
guidance ).  Breene and Nunes82 further examine the opportunity cost of merging. 
The idea is that large scale and therefore very complex transactions consume a 
considerable amount of time and management attention. The necessary integrative 
effort often comes at the expense of an entities core capabilities and business 
performance. 
 
4.3. The Daimler Chrysler Merger 
At the time the Daimler Chrysler merger was among the largest mergers in history with a 
transaction volume of 40 billion US$. . The case is of interest because it was perceived to be 
a merger of equals, which would not only create significant synergies and provide mutual 
entrance to new markets but further create one of the world’s leading automotive group or as 
Daimler’s CEO Jürgen Schrempp called it the “Welt AG”. The case study will be structured 
as follows. First I will outline the motivations behind the merger and the necessary steps 
taken prior to announcement. The main section focuses on the potential sources of value 
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creation / destruction. The study further addresses the most important elements that must be 
accounted for in such a complex international transaction such as differing corporate 
cultures, difficulties with varying legal environments etc. The last section provides an insight 
on how the merger has effected the valuation of the combined entity in the short and the long 
run and ultimately tests whether post merger integration has been achieved successfully. 
4.3.1. Company Profiles of Daimler and Chrysler 
In 1997, one year prior to the merger with Chrysler, Daimler Benz AG was Germany’s largest 
industrial group. The group was primarily known for its automotive division with Mercedes as 
a prominent luxury brand but Daimler’s automotive division also comprised the 
manufacturing of commercial vehicles. Apart from its car division Daimler Benz further had 
operations in the fields of Aerospace, automotive related services and other directly 
managed businesses. In 1997 the group achieved revenues of US$ 68.9 billion and had 
operations in more than 100 countries.   
 
Chrysler on the other hand was mainly active in the U.S with 93% of total sales coming from 
North America. Chrysler was one of the three big American car manufacturers and had finally 
recovered from disappointing performance in the eighties. In 1997 Chrysler had the second 
best year of its history, which was mainly due to the huge success of the Chrysler family van. 
Apart from automotive operations Chrysler was engaged in financial services, which was 
mainly related to consumer financing of Chrysler products. 
4.3.2. Motivations Behind The Merger 
I have already outlined the most common motivations for M&A in the theoretical section, 
therefore I will try to center my attention on the reasoning of the executives of Daimler Benz 
AG and Chrysler. Mr. Schrempp, at the time CEO of Daimler Benz AG, can be considered 
the initiator of the merger, as he wished to create the already mentioned “Welt AG” by 
combining the two independent entities in a merger of equals. In a press conference Mr. 
Schrempp states: 
 
“The two companies are a perfect fit of two leaders in their respective markets. Both 
companies have dedicated and skilled workforces and successful products, but in 
different markets and different parts of the world. By combining and utilizing each other’s 
strengths, we will have a pre-eminent strategic position in the global marketplace for the 
benefit of our customers. We will be able to exploit new markets, and we will improve 
return and value for our shareholders. This is a historic merger that will change the face 
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of the automotive industry. This is much more than a merger; today we are creating the 
world’s leading automotive company for the 21st century. We are combining the two most 
innovative car companies in the world.”83 
 
Mr. Schrempp’s statement already indicates the main factors relevant for the merger 
decision. Both companies derived the majority of their revenues from domestic operations 
but were trying to expand globally. Daimler achieved 63% of its sales in Europe and Chrysler 
even 93% in North America. Thus by combining their operations while at the same time 
maintaining their distinctive brands, both companies would complement each other favorably. 
Daimler could increase its presence in the U.S and Chrysler could effectively enter Europe. 
The merged entity could draw upon immediate growth opportunities more easily by using 
each others infrastructure and capacities. Looking at the theoretical background both firms 
show asset exploiting behavior and are essentially market seeking to exploit there 
competitive advantage ( See OLI model by Dunning ). Another factor, which was not 
indicated by executive management but was prevailing in the automotive industry of the late 
nineties was excess capacity, a problem I have already pointed out in the section on value 
drivers. By combining its operations the new Daimler Chrysler group might have been less 
exposed to the overcapacity issue. The next paragraph will list the main arguments for 
merging Daimler and Chrysler as indicated by the corresponding executive members of each 
party. The information is based on the Daimler Chrysler Merger prospectus and the research 
paper of Blasko, Netter and Sinkey. The Daimler Benz Management board unanimously 
approved the merger and qualified their decision with the following main arguments. These 
arguments are consistent with sources of value creation as identified by Grinblatt and 
Titman84 and others: 
 
• Operating synergies: By far the most common motivation for mergers. According to the 
estimates in the Daimler Chrysler merger prospectus85 Daimler Benz expected short and 
long term synergies amounting to $ 1.4 billion in the first year after the merger and annual 
synergies of $ 3 billion within the first three to five years after the merger. Executive 
management stressed that these synergies were not to be achieved by the closing down 
of plants and a decrease in the workforce but rather through possible short term 
synergies in procurement, distribution and Research & Development and long term 
synergies especially in the further development and growth of new markets. 
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• Market power: As stated in the merger prospectus the immediate extension of Daimler’s 
product range, resulting in an increased brand diversity, would decrease its dependence 
on the premium segment, and a further expansion in the U.S would ultimately strengthen 
its competitive position in the global automotive industry. 
• Enhanced liquidity: Refering to the prospectus Daimler Benz argues that founding the 
world’s third largest automotive group in terms of market capitalization, total revenues 
and earnings, would very likely increase the liquidity for future Daimler Chrysler 
shareholders. 
• Earnings diversification: According to Blasko, Netter and Sinkey86 acquiring firms focus 
on earnings diversification in an attempt to generate higher cash flows at the same risk 
level. This approach substitutes reductions in business risk ( earnings fluctuations ) for 
greater financial risk ( leverage ). Grinblat and Titman87 say that diversification can 
reduce the probability of bankruptcy and avoid information problems arising in external 
capital markets. 
 
Chrysler also unanimously gave its approval for the merger. Expected synergies were also a 
main argument but will not be repeated again, however this argument and the actual 
monetary benefits apply to both parties. The remaining key factors leading to the approval of 
the board were: 
 
• Market power: As stated in the merger prospectus88 the market power argument also 
played a significant role for Chrysler but was regarded from a different angle as 
compared to Daimler. Under the assumption of rapid consolidation, finally leaving only a 
few global players behind, Daimler Chrysler would be in a better position to withstand 
competition. 
• Complementary strengths: In the prospectus Chrysler referred to two fields where 
Daimler and Chrysler would be able to develop and realize complementary strengths. 
First Daimler and Chrysler would complement each others product portfolio and 
geographic reach. With respect to the product portfolio Daimler had a competitive 
advantage in high end and luxury vehicles and Chrysler had a strong position with the 
heavily demanded sports utility vehicles and minivans. Second they could learn from their 
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counterparts core competencies. In the case of Daimler this would be its excellent 
reputation for engineering, whereas Chrysler is considered to be extraordinarily strong in 
product development. It think that both firms considered the main sources of value 
creation to come from revenue enhancement and cost savings and saw relatively little 
potential from resource redeployment. 
 
Interestingly and in contrast to Daimler, Chrysler’s executive board did also mention 
concerns such as possible difficulties related to the complex integration of such two large 
geographically dispersed corporations. However the potential risks of the transaction will be 
treated in more detail in the following paragraph. 
4.3.3. Possible Risk Factors Associated with the Merger 
Even though the possible risk factors were anticipated by both parties, none of the two 
believed that they could be severe enough to diminish the expected gains from the 
transaction and ultimately lead to value destruction.  
As with most mergers the major risk is the shortfall of expected synergies, which justify the 
paid premium for the target entity in the course of the merger. Thus if these synergies are not 
achieved in the long run they can not make up for the costs related to the merger and the 
already mentioned premium.  The question is how the new merged entity can control for the 
actual realization of synergies. I believe that the far most important determinant in this 
respect is a successful integration of business operations and even more important corporate 
culture 
Only if the employees of the merged entity feel comfortable with the new corporation, 
meaning that they perceive the merger to be increasing their personal utility, then synergies 
will be achieved. In this respect it should be noted that ultimately there are always people 
behind accounting numbers and financial performance. The Daimler Chrysler merger was 
especially exposed to this risk since as a cross border merger between Germany and the 
U.S, geographic and cultural dispersion was considerable. The next section will relate the 
potential risks to the Daimler Chrysler Case. Apart from the cultural differences, there are 
other risk factors which have to be considered such as transaction related risks and other 
exogenous risks, which can not be controlled by the firm. 
4.3.3.1. Risks Related to Corporate Culture 
The merger between Daimler and Chrysler was intended to be a merger of equals. However 
it was obvious from the beginning that Daimler would be the stronger partner. As a 
consequence former Chrysler employees were afraid that their German counterparts would 
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be privileged. Additionally Daimler would sooner or later impose its own corporate culture on 
the merged entity, which may not fit Chrysler’s vision of corporate identity. 
 
Blasko, Netter and Sinkey mention another89 aspect which was perceived unfavorably by 
Chrysler. Upon Robert Eaton’s retirement, Daimler Chrysler’s Co-CEO, which was due in 3 
years time, the planned dual headquarters, one in Auburn Hills, Michigan, and one in 
Stuttgart, would likely be combined to a single headquarter in Germany. This would imply the 
centralization of control and decision power in Germany, which was necessary to mesh the 
so far competing marketing, engineering and manufacturing departments. Despite the 
competitive aspect of combining the departments, the centralization created more insecurity 
and disapproval among Chrysler employees. The problems related to Mr. Eaton’s retirement 
and consequently the insecurity among Chrysler employees is consistent with one of the 
seven rules for successful post merger integration by Habeck et al. namely leadership and 
could probably have been avoided. 
 
Blasko, Netter and Sinkey point out that the role of labor unions and their influence on 
management’s decisions is also a significant cultural difference. Compared to the U.S, 
German labor unions have a stronger influence, which is due to the fact that employee 
representatives, which representatives of labor unions are part of, are legally obligated to be 
part of the supervisory board. This form of governance is not the case in the U.S, where the 
board of directors usually consists of independent outside directors. Considering the case of 
an unexpected economic downturn, which is likely to result in layoffs, the question is how 
these layoffs will be balanced between the U.S and Germany. This problem can be directly 
related to the structural barriers I have mentioned in the section on limits to value creation. 
According to Blasko, Netter and Sinkey  this problem was neither addressed during pre- or 
post-negotiation talks. In my opinion Daimler Chrysler management must have been aware 
of this issue but simply underestimated it.90 
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Blasko, Netter and Sinkey91 find that differing management compensation policies also imply 
significant conflict potential. This finding is also supported by Digeorgio92 or Bruner et al93.. In 
this context compensation policy primary concerns executive management. Executive 
compensation between the U.S and Europe varies significantly. Around the time of the 
merger the average total compensation for American executives amounted to US$ 1.1 million 
compared to only US$ 400.000 in Germany. The relatively low compensation for German 
executives is due to the European understanding of social justice, thus European 
governments and ultimately its corporations refuse to pay such high salaries. In recent years 
executive compensation has increased significantly although it is still far away from American 
standards. In the case of the merger the former compensation systems of Daimler Benz and 
Chrysler were replaced for a common performance based stock appreciation rights system. 
The appreciation rights were intended to bear the same benefits like stock option plans only 
without stocks being purchased or sold. Instead the difference between the strike price and 
the stock price on the day of exercise is paid out in cash. This system was designed for 80 to 
250 top executives in the merged entity. A good example of the vast difference between 
American and German executive compensation are the total compensation packages of the 
two CEOs. In 1997 Chrysler’s CEO Robert Eaton received US$ 11.5 million, which is almost 
six times the amount of Mr. Schrempp’s US$ 2 million compensation package. The reverse 
situation was the case for the average employee. German labor costs almost doubled the 
amount of their American counterparts. Thus the average American Chrysler employee was 
expecting a significant salary increase. A solution to this problem would be the introduction of 
a region based salary system, which was based on competitive companies that were 
operating under a similar environment. 
4.3.3.2. Transaction Related Risks 
As stated in the Daimler Chrysler merger prospectus94, management considers the 
envisaged exchange ratio for Daimler and respectively Chrysler to obtain shares of the 
merged Daimler Chrysler entity as a potential risk factor. The exchange ratio for former 
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shareholders of the separate entities was fixed. This indicates that any increase or decrease 
in the share price of each entity and consequently a change in the market value between the 
signing of the combination agreement and the closing of the merger would not be accounted. 
Thus any significant change in the market value during that specified period would leave one 
side disadvantaged, since they receive less than their shares are actually worth. 
 
Yet another uncertainty, which had to be considered was the accounting treatment of the 
transaction. In 1997 the US GAP and IAS standards allowed for two methods regarding the 
accounting treatment of a transaction. An accounting treatment under the “purchase method” 
records the goodwill of the target entity as the difference between the actual acquisition price 
and the fair value of the target’s tangible and intangible assets less assumed liabilities. With 
the “pooling of interests method” the assets and liabilities of both entities are simply 
combined under a new “ consolidated balance sheet “, thus the acquisition price and 
inherently the goodwill of the target is not accounted. Compared to pooling of interests, the 
purchase method results in higher asset values, which increases amortization and 
depreciation expenses and ultimately lower the net income of the new entity. According to 
estimates of Daimler Chrysler, an accounting treatment under the purchase method under 
the assumption that the transaction was completed by January 1 1997, the decrease in net 
income for year ending 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 would amount to US$ 717 
million. The treatment of the transaction was unclear and dependent on numerous 
conditions. Whether or not the transaction would qualify for pooling of interest was still to be 
seen and with it the financial impact. It should be noted that today only the accounting 
treatment of a transaction under the purchase method remains 
Both of the above risks are stemming from technical barriers. Another issue, which had to be 
addressed but was perceived as a formality were government approvals mainly related to 
antitrust and competition, thus a structural barrier. Such approvals may only be obtained in 
connection with reorganization like divestitures of certain business activities or operating 
restrictions. 
 
Blasko, Netter and Sinkey95 point out another risk factor, which I believe has either been 
ignored or otherwise underestimated and can be related to a structural barrier. It was unclear 
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whether the new Daimler Chrysler share would be included in the American S&P 500 index. 
The main risk was related to a possible rejection by S&P 500 to include the new share in the 
index. A rejection would imply a significant loss of American shareholders in the new entity. A 
solid American shareholder base would be crucial to guarantee a healthy balance between 
European and American shareholders of Daimler Chrysler. Despite several attempts by 
Daimler and Chrysler management to include the company’s share in the index, S&P 
rejected the listing before the merger was completed. The reasoning behind the rejection 
was that Daimler Chrysler was to be incorporated in Germany, therefore registered under 
German Law and also paying taxes in Germany. This conflicted with S&P long term policy to 
only include U.S corporations. S&P rejection of DaimlerChrysler had a dramatic impact on 
the Chrysler share. Upon the day of the announcement the value of Chrysler shares dropped 
by 14.6 %. Mainly index funds but also other institutional investors which were at the time 
invested in Chrysler could not be invested in Daimler Chrysler or at least not through S&P 
500. Even though the Daimler Chrysler shares were to be traded at NYSE and several other 
stock exchanges worldwide the ultimate result was a strong reduction of U.S shareholders. 
Even though the announcement took place before the merger was completed the impact of 
this event had a negative long term effect on Daimler Chrysler 
Harris et al96 have also examined the impact of the change in American shareholder 
ownership. They find that within six months after the merger, American equity ownership of 
the consolidated firm had decreased from 44 to 21%. They relate the migration of ownership 
to a lack of corporate governance and disclosure practices, thus a lack of protection 
especially towards minority shareholder.  Coffee, Harris et al.97 say that the German 
incorporation of Daimler Chrysler implied a stronger presence of Daimler in the Daimler 
Chrysler supervisory board, thus presenting an informational advantage. Consequently 
American shareholders faced asymmetric information or as outlined in the theoretical section 
an informational barrier, which negatively impacted American share ownership. 
4.3.3.3. Other Exogenous Risks 
Regarding industry and market related risks the merged entity will in some cases be even 
more exposed to certain risks than the two standalone companies. Operating on a global 
level requires a diligent organization and management of resources. As noted in the Daimler 
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Chrysler merger prospectus98 government regulations and customer requirements for 
example related to fuel economy, emission controls and safety will vary across countries and 
therefore be more complex to handle. Global operations further increase the exposure to 
foreign currency exchange rates and furthermore to the overall economic situation in different 
countries. For example a booming U.S economy in combination with high demand may be 
outweighed by an economic downturn in the European market. 
4.3.4. The Daimler Chrysler Integration Process and the Ultimate Failure of Post 
Merger Implementation 
4.3.4.1. The Integration Process 
In her case study on organizational development, Dianne C.ST. Jean examines the 
integration process of the merger and lists the main difficulties related to long term 
implementation. The newly merged Daimler Chrysler entity was incorporated under German 
law and therefore required to have a management and supervisory board. The supervisory 
board, consisting of ten shareholder representatives and 10 employee representatives 
comprised 5 employee representatives of each counterpart in order to assist the integration. 
Basically the same accounted for the management board with eight members from each 
team and two independent members, which were responsible for the entity’s Aerospace and 
Services divisions. 
Jean99 notes that one of the very first actions of the management board was the formation of 
a committee, named the “ Chairman’s Integration Council “ ( CIC ), with the main 
responsibility to promote the integration of the two companies. Each of the companies 
prepared themselves for the integration with up to 70 teams and working groups. Additionally 
an overall coordination team called the “ Post Merger Integration Team “  ( PMI )was 
introduced. The PMI was headed by Daimler Benz and Chrysler managers and responsible 
for ensuring the integration in all areas. The PMI comprised several integration teams, which 
were in two categories “automotive” and “non automotive and corporate functions”. The PMIs 
reported to the Chairman’s Integration Council; however ultimate decisions stayed with the 
management board. 
Despite the positive perception of the market, the integration managers of Daimler Chrysler 
faced considerable difficulties, which were especially related to business culture. Jean100 
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finds that on one hand there was German Daimler with an emphasis on formality, strict 
hierarchies and structured decision making process and respect for titles and proper names. 
On the other hand there was the more casual American Chrysler with the promotion of cross 
functional teams and free forum discussions. In an early effort to promote mutual integration 
Chrysler even offered their employees business culture lessons in order to understand the 
German way of doing business. Mr. Stallkamp, an executive manager at Daimler Chrysler 
coming from Chrysler and among others responsible for integration stated, when asked 
about his approach to the integration: “More and more of my time, if you include the cultural 
side, is spent on integrating the two companies. My job is to integrate them as much as 
possible, so we can get the synergies we signed up for, to get one company out of two. The 
biggest challenge is the need for face to face communications, rather than videophones. You 
need to meet people in person, rather than long distance, so that means we have to travel 
more. You have to socialize with each other, you have to meet after business meetings. 
Otherwise, the comfort factor would keep pushing people back into their own ( traditional 
cliques ).”101 This statement well describes the problems related to business culture. Despite 
the effort to solve the problem no team or culture class can replace face to face contact, 
which is crucial in forming a unified corporate identity.  
Soon the problems of integration intensified and the CIC, which was created to oversee the 
group wide integration fell apart. According to Jean102 the problem was that the CIC only 
consisted of very few members so that senior officers from both sides felt left behind in the 
decision making of the company. As a consequence the task of the CIC was redirected to the 
management board. Mr. Schrempp however installed a small cadre of loyal advisors, to be 
named Schrempp’s “ kitchen cabinet” by Chrysler managers. The cabinet remained 
Schrempp’s primary source for information on the integration process.  
The PMI on the other hand was intended to identify the combination potential on an 
operational level and to serve as a catalyst for process redesign. Thus it was crucial in 
achieving early synergies. The general approach was to identify best practices among both 
sides and to establish a new system based on the combination of these strengths. In reality 
both sides wasted their time on trying to convince the counterpart of the superiority of their 
system instead of elaborating a new business system. Consequently the operational issues 
were more and more neglected and instead especially the German managers were focusing 
on achieving their portion of the financial synergy target that had been allocated to them. 
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Further efforts to encourage integration on an operational level were soon aborted by 
Daimler’s sensitive position on maintaining a separate brand image. Especially Mercedes-
Benz managers were extremely reluctant to any collaboration in this area. Consequently a lot 
of time and resources were wasted on such issues without any valuable outcome. 
 
As Jean103 points out, differences in financial reporting and investor relations turned out to be 
problematic as well. Chrysler having recovered from past financial crisis through major 
process redesigns and proper cash management have received great recognition for their 
achievements in turning the company around. Daimler Benz, which prior to the merger had 
about twice the size of Chrysler had adopted to US GAAP in 1995 and still had to work out a 
proper cash management. At the discontent of Chrysler financial managers all cash was now 
pooled in the new company, which made it difficult to trace sources and uses of cash.  
Chrysler financial managers noted with sarcasm that Daimler was not able to produce a 
proper cash flow statement. Another problem was the company’s approach to the investment 
community. Compared to Chrysler, Daimler was lacking transparency and attitude towards 
American investors, which are used to a transparent capital market. Chrysler on the other 
hand had significant experience in coping with analysts and Wall Street participants. Chrysler 
strongly urged Daimler to provide quarterly financial statements of Daimler Chrysler to the 
investment community in the U.S. However Daimler followed a more traditional approach and 
refused to provide the quarterly financial statements. Instead the Daimler financial head 
insisted on reporting only the combined semi annual statements. At the time Daimler 
Chrysler Co CEO Schrempp declared that he wouldn’t bother with trying to please young, 
immature MBA analysts. When the statement was made public, the Daimler Chrysler share 
dropped by 12%. 
4.3.4.2. Strategic Mistakes After the Merger 
Mr. Schrempp’s vision to create the first truly global auto group was a fine idea but proved to 
be a strategic mistake in practice. 
 
Despite the fact that Daimler Chrysler was already officially incorporated, Daimler and 
Chrysler still functioned like two separate entities far from being a united corporation. The 
inability and probably to a certain degree the unwillingness of executive management to 
foster a true harmonization of Daimler and Chrysler was a crucial aspect in the ultimate 
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failure of the merger. Especially Mr. Schrempp seemed to have followed a different goal from 
the beginning with the envisioned “ Welt AG “. Mr. Schrempp’s true intention for the merger 
became clear in late 2000 in a financial times interview. When asked about the promoted “ 
merger of equals “ Schrempp replied the following “If I had gone and said Chrysler would be 
a division, everybody on their side would have said, 'There is no way we'll do a deal,' " 104. In 
the interview Schrempp further indicated that he did not intend a merger of equals from the 
beginning but rather an outward acquisition. Summarizing the interview Schrempp more or 
less publicly declared that he had played a strategically motivated trick on Chrysler’s 
shareholders and management in order to eventually internalize Chrysler as a division, which 
would not have been possible otherwise, thus he disguised it as a merger of equals. 
Consequently Kirk Kerkorian, a main shareholder of Chrysler  filed a USD 2 bn. law suit 
against Daimler Chrysler accusing Mr. Schrempp of fraud with respect to the disguised 
merger of equals and consequently a lack of acquisition premium for Chrysler shareholders. 
The fact there was no acquisition premium for Chrysler is due to the accounting treatment of 
the transaction as a merger of equals. As already pointed out in the theoretical section very 
low or even no acquisition premiums usually have a positive impact on value creation. 
However in this case this potential advantage was definitely outweighed by Daimler’s true 
intentions or in the context of the theoretic background, diverging strategic goals of the 
merging firms. 
 
It was in early 1999, when Mr. Schrempp and his American pendant Robert Eaton decided to 
commence talks with Nissan Motor Corp. regarding the acquisition of a possible equity stake. 
The elapsed time since the Daimler Chrysler merger had not even passed a single year and 
Daimler Chrysler was seriously considering to enter the Asian market. The effort to gain a 
foothold in Asia came at a time where all the capacities should have been focused on the 
integration of Daimler and Chrysler and the creation of a truly consolidated Daimler Chrysler 
entity. Eventually  merger talks with Nissan failed but instead Daimler Chrysler found an 
adequate partner in Mitsubishi. As noted by Blasko, Netter and Sinkey105 in march 2000 
about a year after the merger talks with Nissan had failed, Daimler Chrysler announced that 
it was bidding for a 34% equity stake in Mitsubishi corporation, making it the world’s third 
largest car maker with combined annual sales of 6.5 million units The plans of Daimler 
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Chrysler to effectively expand its operations to Asia were perceived negatively by its 
shareholders. The expected benefits of the merger were not achieved and the results lagged 
behind. The shareholders slowly understood that the praised merger turned out to be more of 
a challenge than expected. Further expansion was likely to require even more financial and 
human resources and would draw the attention from the implementation of the Daimler 
Chrysler merger away to the new Asian adventure. The following table gives an overview on 
previously mentioned events, which had a negative effect on the share price of Daimler 
Chrysler. 
Table 1: Post Merger Abnormal Returns of Daimler Chrysler 
 
Source: Matej Blasko, Jeffrey M. Netter and Joseph F. Sinkey Jr., “ The Daimler Chrysler Merger: 
Short term gains, long run wealth destruction?”, Issues in International Corporate Control and 
Governance, Volume 15, page 309 
 
4.3.5. Shareholder Reactions to the Announcement of the Merger and Subsequent 
Events 
 
Immediate Reactions to the Announcement of the Merger 
The following section provides information on how the merger was perceived by the 
shareholders of Daimler Benz and Chrysler. The first part will concentrate on the immediate 
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reactions of the market to the announcement of the merger. Afterwards I will illustrate the 
long run development of the share price of the merged Daimler Chrysler entity and certain 
events that were crucial for the future development of Daimler Chrysler. Looking at the share 
price development provides a good measure to asses whether value was created or 
destroyed as a consequence of the merger. 
The following table indicates the immediate reaction of shareholders following the 
announcement of the merger. The time window concerns May 6th and 7th 1998 where the 
merger agreement was signed and announced worldwide one day later. The combined two 
day abnormal return of the Chrysler share amounted to 30.9%, which conforms with most 
empirical evidence on positive return of shares of the target entity. Contrary to most empirical 
evidence Daimler Benz shares also showed a positive abnormal return of 4.57%. The 
positive reaction of the target shareholders is not surprising even though the increase in the 
share price was above the returns, indicated by empirical evidence. The positive abnormal 
return of the Daimler Benz shareholders as the bidder can be interpreted as a signal of 
confidence that shareholders had in the Daimler Benz management and ultimately the 
merger. 
Table 2: Abnormal Returns to Daimler Benz and Chrysler around Announcement 
 
 
Source: Matej Blasko, Jeffrey M. Netter and Joseph F. Sinkey Jr., “ The Daimler Chrysler Merger: Short 
term gains, long run wealth destruction?”, Issues in International Corporate Control and Governance, 
Volume 15, page 308 
 
The next table provides the proforma market capitalization of the combined entity in the 
same time frame. This illustrates the announcement effect in absolute monetary value terms. 
As one can see during two days the proforma value of the combined entity increased by US$ 
10.3 billion. The increase reflects the information that synergies were expected to amount to 





                                     Table 3: Market Cap. of Daimler Benz and Chrysler around Announcement 
 
                                     Source: Matej Blasko, Jeffrey M. Netter and Joseph F. Sinkey Jr., “ The Daimler Chrysler Merger: Short     
term gains, long run wealth destruction?”, Issues in International Corporate Control and Governance, 
Volume 15, page 308 
 
The reaction of the market underlines the notion that the market is efficient when it comes to 
the processing of information. Interestingly the market already showed a significant reaction 
one day prior to the official announcement of the merger, which implies that some investors 
must have had an informational advantage.  
 
Long Term Impact of the Merger 
Subsequently to the previously mentioned events Daimler Chrysler was not able to create a 
common corporate identity and thus a successful implementation of the merger. The 
expected long term synergies were not realized instead the combined earnings of Daimler 
Chrysler were way behind expectations. What followed in the years after the merger was 
wealth destruction on a massive scale. Chrysler sales dropped drastically but also Daimler’s 
luxury brand Mercedes suffered from weak demand, which was caused by the overall weak 
economic development in Europe. In the U.S the weak demand for Chrysler cars was due to 
intense competition from Japanese car makers such as Toyota and Nissan. This did not only 
concern Chrysler but furthermore basically all U.S car manufacturers, which were loosing 
market shares to their Japanese competitors. Chrysler’s earnings have further been hurt by 
worse than expected results in Asia and Latin America. The European Smart car division 
also registered dramatic losses since its introduction in 1998. Although the actual losses are 
hard to measure since the Smart division until 2004 did not report their financial results 
separately, experts estimate that only the losses from Smart during the period from 1998 to 
2006 exceed EUR 5 billion. The combination of all these factors posed a heavy burden on 
Daimler Chrysler. The question is how Daimler Chrysler would have performed if 
management had succeeded in integrating the two companies. The following table depicts 
the share price development of the Daimler Chrysler share on NYSE over a period of seven 
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years from November 1998 till November 2005. As one can see an American shareholder 
would have lost about 40% of his invested capital over the period. The blue line represents 
the Daimler Chrysler share price development, whereas the orange line is a random 
benchmark in this case the development of the EuroStoxx 50 index. Compared to the 
benchmark one can see that value was especially destroyed in the early years after the 
merger. Blasko, Netter and Sinkey note that during the period from May 7th 1998 ( day after 
the merger announcement ) to March 14th 2000, the Daimler Chrysler market capitalization 
declined by 34% compared to a +34,5% return to GM shareholders and a -12,3% return to 
Ford shareholders over the same period. Their finding is consistent with with that of 
Laughran and Vijh106, who predict negative post-acquisition returns to long term shareholders 
in stock mergers. After the September 11th terrorist attacks the stock market generally 
surpassed a phase of decline. Nevertheless Daimler Chrysler was not able to recover until 
late 2005, where management announced that it would perform a large scale restructuring, 
which would also include layoffs of about 14.000 employees. 
 
                                    Figure 7: Daimler Chrysler Long Term Share Price Development 
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4.4. The Renault Nissan Merger 
In early 1999 Renault and Nissan announced that they would enter into a strategic alliance. 
For the beginning Renault bought a 36.8 % equity stake in Nissan, which was at the time the 
largest investment ( US$ 5.4 billion )in a Japanese company by a foreign Investor. 
Additionally Renault took a 15.2% equity stake in Nissan Diesel and bought Nissan’s 
financial subsidiaries in Europe. In early 2002 Renault increased its equity stake in Nissan to 
44.4%, while Nissan bought a 15% equity stake in Renault for about EUR 2.2 bn. Renault 
had been reviewing several opportunities for further expansion and thus entering new 
markets, since its operations were mainly limited to Europe. From Renault’s side the alliance 
was carefully chosen and prepared diligently since the company wanted to avoid another 
strategic mistake like the failed merger with Volvo a few years earlier. Nissan on the other 
hand was in serious financial trouble with large debt outstanding basically forcing Nissan to 
the verge of bankruptcy. Thus Nissan was looking for a partner with sufficient financial 
means to cover the company’s debt and to return it to profitability. Apart from that, the 
strategic alliance was based on several other reasons, which will be illustrated in a later 
chapter of the case. The merger did also bear significant risks, which from a corporate 
cultural point of view were even greater as compared to the Daimler Chrysler case. Michael 
Y. Yoshino and Perry L. Fagan have prepared a case study, which gives a detailed insight on 
the Renault Nissan alliance and was taken as a basis for the following chapters. 
4.4.1. Company Profiles of Renault and Nissan 
Renault was the oldest and most prestigious French car manufacturer. Renault operated 
profitably throughout the nineties, thanks to a restructuring program, which had been 
imposed to the company previously. Despite relatively small operating margins, Renault 
achieved satisfying financial results in the late nineties, mainly due to a tight cost structure, a 
relatively strong car market and the successful introduction of new models. Yoshino and 
Fagan107 find that at the time Renault sold about 85% of its cars within the boundaries of 
Europe, a third of which were sold in the domestic French market, thus international 
presence outside Europe was only marginal. Regarding the product range Renault was 
principally manufacturing small to medium sized cars, which was due to the preferences of 
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the European market. Besides that Renault had minor operations in the premium and light 
commercial vehicle segment. 
 
Tokyo based Nissan group was among Japan’s top three automakers. Despite its good 
reputation for productive performance Nissan had been loosing market shares in its domestic 
market for the past 27 years. In the time before the alliance Nissan was close to insolvency 
with debt amounting to US$ 20 billion. Yoshino and Fagan108 say that Nissan’s poor 
performance stemmed from high procurement costs, product and brand management and 
excess bureaucratic structures. Regarding international operations Nissan had more 
international presence than Renault. Nissan had significant operations in the U.S with its 
subsidiary Nissan Motor Corp. Apart from the U.S, the group was active in South America, 
Australia, Asia, South Africa and to a small extent in Europe. 
4.4.2. Motivations Behind the Alliance 
In the face of rapid global consolidation among major car manufacturers Renault and Nissan 
formed the alliance to sustainably enter and survive the global market, and to benefit from 
mutual learning and capability building. The combination made sense at a time where 
Renault was under pressure to increase its international presence and operational 
performance, Nissan on the other hand under the prevailing financial condition had the 
choice to either find a strong partner or go out of business. As Mr. Ghosn, at the time 
appointed by Renault as Nissan’s COO, explained the rationale for Renault’s investment: “ 
On paper, the deal made sense for both sides: Nissan’s strength in North America filled an 
important gap for Renault, while Renault’s cash reduced Nissan’s mountain of debt. The 
capabilities of the companies were also complementary: Renault was known for innovative 
design and Nissan for the quality of its engineering.”109Renault, which itself had undergone a 
financial crisis during the eighties had successfully recovered and was confident in turning 
around Nissan’s financial performance while at the same time drawing upon Nissan expertise 
in engineering and productivity. The following points provide the pro’s of the alliance for each 
companies. 
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4.4.2.1. Renault 
• International expansion Opportunity: As noted by Fujimoto and Heller110, Renault was 
seeking for expansion opportunities for quite a long time since its operations were mainly 
limited to Europe. Under the circumstances of a consolidating car industry, from a 
strategic point of view Renault was forced to expand if it wanted to remain a main global 
car manufacturer. Due to its effective restructuring program and extensive cost cutting 
Renault had sufficient funds but was lacking an adequate partner. Nissan was especially 
attractive to Renault because it already had global presence especially in Japan and the 
U.S, the world’s largest car market. Summarizing the above reasoning, the main rationale 
for seeking international expansion were based on expected revenue enhancements 
through the penetration of new markets while at the same time using each others 
distribution channels. Or as Doz and Hamel put it, the strategic imperative here was “ 
racing for the world “ ( see theoretical section ). 
• Operational productivity and engineering skills: Despite its disappointing financial 
performance Nissan was still among the world’s leading manufacturers with respect to 
productivity and engineering. Fujimoto and Heller state that Renault was lacking such 
capabilities and was eager to improve its deficits in assembly productivity, product 
development lead times and engineering expertise. By entering the alliance Renault 
would be able to perform diligent benchmarking of Nissan plants and knowledge 
exchange with Nissan engineers. Shared research and development would enable 
Renault to achieve long time benefits from Nissan’s engineering capabilities especially in 
the field of engine and transmission system development. In this case Renault definitely 
pursued a long term objective, which I believe is consistent to what Doz and Hamel refer 
to as “ racing for the future “. 
• Operational Synergies: According to Yoshino and Fagan111, Renault and Nissan were 
expecting to achieve overall cost savings and synergies of US$ 3.3 billion by 2002. Most 
of them would be coming from joint procurement of parts, combined sales and distribution 
by using each others distribution networks, shared research and development, and 
synergies in manufacturing basically through intensive platform sharing. 
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• Immediate support on pending financial crisis: Nissan’s debt was amounting to US$ 20 
billion prior to the merger thus Nissan creditors were pushing the company to find a 
financially liquid partner. Renault was willing to invest US$ 5.4 billion for the minority 
stake in Nissan ( 36.8 % ), which would enable Nissan to pay down its liabilities. As 
Yoshino and Fagan112 describe apart from the immediate effect, Nissan would benefit 
from Renault’s experience in elaborating and implementing a radical restructuring plan. 
Renault’s man for the job would be Mr. Ghosn, who had earned himself the accurate 
nickname “Le Cost Killer” for the successful implementation of a cost reduction program 
at Renault. The Alliance would probably not have been possible if Nissan hadn’t been in 
such a severe situation. This was especially true for Japan, a country originally very 
reluctant to outside investors. However  the Japanese economic crisis and an urgent 
need for corporate restructuring only made the entrance of foreign investors possible. As 
previously described this was one of the factors that drove cross border transactions. 
• Improvements in brand management and design: Fujimoto and Heller113 note that in the 
late nineties Nissan had poor brand design, infrequent model changes and weak overall 
product planning. Renault on the other hand had a good reputation for innovative brand 
conception and design, which was supported by the fact that Renault had introduced 
several new models and successors of existing lines with great success during the 
nineties. 
• Long term strategic management: According to Fujimoto and Heller Nissan’s critical 
situation was also resulting from strategic mistakes. Under pressure from its main 
competitor Toyota, Nissan tried to match Toyota’s huge product range despite constantly 
decreasing sales volumes. As a consequence Nissan had too many different models and 
distribution channels. Yet another problem which concerned the operational level but was 
closely tied to long term strategy was Nissan’s inefficient procurement of parts. Basically 
all Japanese car manufacturers had close relationships with their suppliers, which 
stemmed from the keiretsu like organizational design. In some cases suppliers had been 
contracted for decades, thus there was little incentive to offer competitive prices. 
Therefore Nissan and other Japanese car manufacturers were paying prices way above 
the international price levels. 
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Overall both partners had good reasons for entering the alliance. Considering the various 
motivations I would categorize it as a Hybrid Alliance, combining both approaches, 
exploitative and an explorative, as mentioned by Koza and Lewin ( see theoretical section ). 
Even though the economic reasoning was the stronger motivation, I think that especially 
Renault had great expectations regarding Nissan’s technical expertise. 
4.4.3. Risk Factors Associated with the Alliance 
A priori the envisaged alliance between Renault and Nissan seemed even more complicated 
than that of Daimler and Chrysler. Compared to Chrysler, Nissan was in a much worse 
position and at the verge of bankruptcy. Renault was a relatively small player in the global 
car industry and was not even close to Daimler’s financial strength. The equity purchase and 
assumption of Nissan’s debt was a risky step for Renault, which required diligent planning 
ahead but also signaled Renault’s confidence in the alliance. The next paragraph will 
underline the major risks associated to the transaction. 
4.4.3.1. Risks Related to Corporate Culture 
The greatest challenge in the alliance was the different business culture. Korine et al114 find 
that the lack of prior cooperation between the two alliance partners and the wide variation in 
culture would make a successful alliance unlikely. Sharon Nkrumah and Jenny Strand115 say 
that the Japanese and French business cultures could not be any more diverse. 
 
Starting with the language barrier and the need to introduce English as the common alliance 
language, which does not necessarily come natural among both French and Japanese 
management, the day to day difficulties were significant. Nkrumah and Strand prepared a 
questionnaire for Renault and Nissan employees where they also addressed problems 
related to the alliance. According to that questionnaire the language barrier was the most 
cited problem by both sides. The respondents also felt that during the early phase of the 
alliance there was a lack of communication especially from higher management levels to 
operational levels. The respondents claimed that most of what they knew about the alliance 
was what they had read in reports in newspapers or T.V.  
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Apart from communicational barriers Japanese and French approach business in an entirely 
different way. The core industries of Japan for a long time were reluctant to open up to 
international partnerships, this was especially true for the car industry. Renault’s participation 
in Nissan was the largest foreign investment so far and would not have been possible if 
Renault hadn’t been on the verge of bankruptcy and could not rely upon the usual support of 
its Keiretsu partners. The management hierarchy in Japan is bottom up whereas it is top 
down in France. A problem mentioned by the respondents to the questionnaires was that for 
French employees working in Japan it was very unusual to work in the same room as their 
boss. The Japanese were used to it and didn’t find anything negative about this system. The 
French employees felt that the atmosphere was too formal, suppressive and limiting their 
freedom, since they had to work under direct supervision of their boss. In France the boss 
would often have a separated office and such direct supervision was practically non existent. 
Thus French employees considered such working conditions rather inappropriate. 
 
All of the above issues occur during post merger integration. I think especially Renault put 
great emphasis on PMI, which was crucial at the early phase of PMI. Otherwise Nissan’s 
initial resentment would not have changed to the better and the alliance would have likely 
failed. As already pointed out in the theoretical section, the importance of PMI is essential to 
the success of any transaction acquisition, merger or alliance. 
4.4.3.2. Transaction Related Risks 
The main risk related to Renault’s initial equity participation was Nissan’s pending financial 
crisis. Renault was the smaller one of the two companies regarding size, market position and 
market capitalization. The decision to buy 36.8% of Nissan’s equity was a considerable risk 
for Renault, especially if Mr. Ghosn would fail to turn Nissan around. In case the expected 
turn around would have not been achieved, Renault itself would have been likely to find itself 
in a financial crisis. However Renault already had bad experience with its failed alliance with 
Volvo and was thus forced to plan any alliance as diligently as possible. Eventually the 
alliance turned out to be a remarkable success but it could have also gone in the opposite 
direction. Hughes and Barsoux116 support the notion that despite the perfect match of the 
Alliance, several industry observers and experts showed strong reservations to the success 
of the Alliance, due to Nissan’s dire financial situation and Renault’s credibility as a Rescuer. 
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4.4.4. Initial Shareholder Reactions to the Announcement of the Merger and Long 
Term Share Price Development 
 
Immediate Reaction to the Merger Announcement 
The immediate reaction of Renault and Nissan shareholders to the announcement of the 
merger was disappointing. According to Nissan executives the alliance was titled “marriage 
of the poor” or as reported in the Asian Wall Street Journal “alliance of the weak”117. A 
possible reason for the rejection of the alliance by the market could have been the fact that 
Renault was not Nissan’s first choice. Nissan had previously tried to enter the alliance with 
Daimler Chrysler, which at the time seemed more promising for Nissan due to its size and 
financial capacity. When asked about Daimler Chrysler Mr. Ghosn explains “ As many people 
know, Renault was not Nissan’s number one choice for partner, Daimler Chrysler was the 
preferred counterpart, which on paper was not that surprising, given its financial muscle and 
reputation at the time. In the end Daimler Chrysler dropped out, believing that Nissan was 
too risky.”118 However Daimler Chrysler didn’t want to take the risk and found a partner in 
Mitsubishi later on. The following graph illustrates the development of Renault’s share price 
from January 1995 to may 2002. Looking at the time window between march 1999, where 
the alliance agreement was signed to may 1999, where the transaction was executed, one 
can see that Renault suffered a significant drop in the share price, while Nissan could only 
register a minor increase, which is rather unusual compared to empirical evidence on target 
shareholder’s return, also taking into consideration that the equity stake of Nissan was paid 
in cash, which is hardly ever perceived negatively. 
 
                  Figure 8: Renault Stock Price Performance ( Jan 1998 – May 2002 ) 
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                       Source: Thomson Financial Data Stream 
 
Long Term Impact of the Merger 
The shareholders of Renault and Nissan initially having rejected the alliance slowly realized 
that the alliance actually worked. This is also contrasting to most empirical findings, which 
suggest that most shareholder returns tend to be persistent over time.  After more than 10 
years of losses, Nissan returned back to profitability already in 2000, the second year of the 
alliance. In the years that followed both companies where able to increase sales volumes 
and market shares along with profitability. The financial turn around of Nissan can to a large 
extent be rewarded to Mr. Ghosn, who played the most essential part in the alliance. Without 
the help of Mr. Ghosn the fast recovery of Nissan would not have been possible. The 
following graph provides an overview of Nissan’s recovery since the formation of the alliance. 
 
                      Figure 9: Nissan Global Sales Volume and Consolidated Net Income from1999 to 2006 
   
                        Source: Nissan Company Website 
 
As previously mentioned the shareholders of both companies witnessed a remarkable long 
term success of the alliance and rewarded the tremendous effort, which has been put into 
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the alliance. The next two graphs reflect the long term share price development of each 
company from the formation of the alliance till end of first quarter 2007: 
 
 
                                 Figure 10: Share Price Development 1999 to 2007-11-06 
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4.4.5. Main Drivers for the Successful Implementation of the Alliance 
Despite the unfavorable reception of the merger, the Alliance between Renault and Nissan 
turned out to be very successful. The following paragraph addresses the main factors, which 
were crucial in the implementation of the alliance. 
 
At the very beginning of the alliance, Renault’s CEO Mr. Schweitzer took a decision, which I 
think was essential to the success of the merger. He decided to send his second man in 
command Mr. Ghosn, at the time VP at Renault, to Nissan and make him chief operating 
officer at Nissan. Upon this decision Renault was willing to dispatch one of its best strategists 
as a top manager at Nissan in order to transfer strategic capabilities as quickly as possible. 
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Yoshino and Fagan119 point out that CEO Schweitzer was of the opinion that managing the 
alliance successfully would mean the transfer of management technologies and best 
practices between the two companies. Fujimoto and Heller120 also find that the dispatching of 
a first class strategist as a top manager to the alliance partner is the most effective way to 
transfer strategic capabilities. Like I have already mentioned Mr. Carlos Ghosn was famous 
for his ability to turn around a company and bring it back to profitability. By transferring Mr. 
Ghosn, Renault indicated to Nissan that it really wanted the alliance to work even if this 
would mean a considerable sacrifice on Renault’s side. Mr. Ghosn was not the only valuable 
Renault employee that was dispatched to Nissan, Renault further sent Thierry Moulonguet 
and Patrick Pelata as Nissan chief financial officer and vice president of strategy and 
planning respectively. Yoshino and Fagan121 note that in order to avoid resentment of 
Nissan’s executive management for being replaced by their French counterparts, Renault’s 
CEO Schweitzer appointed Nissan’s executive Vice President Tsumoto Sawada as Renault’s 
senior vice president and personal adviser to himself. By encouraging the exchange of 
executive personnel and ultimately human capital, Schweitzer laid a solid foundation for 
further collaboration, based on trust and mutual respect. 
 
During the early years of the alliance Mr. Sawada commented the following, when being 
asked for the success of the alliance “ Alliance is like a marriage. The partners must make 
constant efforts to make a marriage a productive and happy one. It is a give and take.” The 
quote of Mr. Sawada describes best the positive attitude, which both companies had in the 
alliance. Its initiator Mr. Schweitzer was of the opinion that the merger was not about creating 
a whole new company, it was rather a combination of two businesses, where combining 
operations seemed reasonable and more important feasible. Schweitzer stated “ We are not 
merging, we are creating a binational company “122; “I do not believe that in a car company 
you can separate the car, the brand, and the corporation. If you try to merge them without 
looking at these, you destroy brand value and brand identity. I also believe strongly that the 
best way to make a relationship work is by doing things together, achieving things together. 
Traditional mergers … run the risk of looking inward more than outward. When it is a 
partnership 13,000 kilometers away, with different languages, and where people look 
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different and behave differently, you are always reminded that you are different. You have to 
accept this fact and not try to ignore it. We sent a management team to Nissan. We said to 
the people we were sending that you aren’t representing Renault. You are sent by Renault to 
work for Nissan.”123 Having laid the foundation for a successful alliance Renault and Nissan 
elaborated a detailed plan to make the alliance work and ensure its ongoing progress. 
 
Yoshino and Fagan124 examine the implementation and coordination of the alliance on the 
following pages. The coordination between the two graphically dispersed companies should 
be performed by 11 so called “cross company teams CCT ”. Their main task was to monitor 
the progress in terms of realization of synergies across the main functional areas. Apart from 
manufacturing, where the synergies were mostly related to economies of scale the CCT’s 
concentrated on product planning, joint procurement, logistics, sales and marketing. A few 
teams additionally focused on markets and regions, which was important to identify where 
the alliance partners could complement each others presence. For example with Nissan 
being well established in the U.S, Renault had the immediate opportunity to enter the market 
without much effort, since it could manufacture on U.S soil by using Nissan’s plants and had 
Nissan’s network of dealerships. Each CCT comprised approximately 10 members, which 
were recruited from middle management positions of both companies. Overall there were 
500 employees from both companies either directly or indirectly related to the work of the 
CCTs. CCT’s was responsible for major areas like manufacturing and further established 
sub-teams where the amount of work would not have been manageable otherwise. The CCT 
itself had a so called “pilot”, which had the overall responsibility of a single CCT and would 
usually be an experienced operational manager. CCT members were not only working for the 
CCT, the work for the CCT was much more an additional effort besides the regular job at the 
respective companies. The total work effort devoted to the CCT ranged from 20 to 80% for 
CCT pilots and 20% for ordinary CCT members. The CCTs had annual meetings to set new 
targets and identify necessary monetary and personnel resources in order to achieve them. 
The CCTs were governed and supported by an Alliance Coordination Bureau, which was by 
two executives, one from each company. The main task of the Coordination Bureau was to 
compare initial expectations and forecasts with the actual results that have so far been 
achieved and to report it to the next managerial level. Apart from the reporting function the 
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Coordination Bureau gave advice in legal and accounting related issues, issues related to 
company policy, which were beyond the scope of CCTs and specific problems within the 
focus of CCTs which required outside support. The CCTs and the Coordination Bureau were 
in daily contact and held meeting on a monthly basis. The Coordination Bureau would in turn 
report the results of the CCTs to the ultimate governing body the so called Alliance Board. 
After receiving the feedback of the Alliance Board, CCTs met again in order to communicate 
the targets from the Alliance Board to the operational level. The board consisted of the 
CEOs, chairmen and executive VPs of both companies. The function of the Alliance Board 
was later replaced by Renault Nissan joint company Renault Nissan B.V., which can be best 
described as the holding company of the alliance. The establishment of the respective 
coordination teams and boards created an informal but very effective organizational 
structure. The structure ensured that the targeted goals were achieved on all organizational 
levels. Top management in the Alliance board could monitor the progress and make sure 
that its orders were being implemented on the operational level of both companies. Nissan 
COO Ghosn described the establishment of the CCTs: 
 
“At a certain point in the negotiations between the two companies, there was a discussion 
about how they would work together. Renault’s negotiators assumed that the best way 
forward would be to set up a series of joint ventures, and they wanted to discuss all legal 
issues surrounding a joint venture : who contributes what and how much, how the output is 
shared, and so forth. The Nissan team pushed back; they wanted to explore management 
and business issues, not legal technicalities. As a result, negotiations were stalled. 
Schweitzer asked me if I could think of a way to resolve that impasse. I recommended 
abandoning the joint venture approach. If you want people to work together, the last thing 
you need is a legal structure that gets in the way. My solution was to introduce informal 
cross-company teams.” 
 
The following graph provides an overview of the general ownership and governance 
structure of the alliance. 
 
Figure11: Renault Nissan Government and Ownership Structure 
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                                                       Source: Renault Alliance Booklet 
In mid 2002, three years after Renault and Nissan had entered the alliance, the CCTs 
proposed further and more intensified cooperation in six areas namely joint purchasing, R&D, 
manufacturing, joint distribution, joint information systems and platform sharing. The special 
focus on these areas and the effort of the coordination teams to achieve long term 
improvements was crucial for the future of the alliance. The extensive exchange of 
knowledge and information was only possible through the cross company teams. In most 
cases the importance of communication, as stated in the Harbeck et al. seven rules for PMI, 
is neglected. To the benefit of Renault and Nissan it was not the case in their alliance. 
• Joint Purchasing 
As a first step Renault and Nissan founded RNPO ( Renault Nissan Purchasing 
Organization ), a virtual joint venture consisting of Renault and Nissan employees from 
France, Japan and the U,S.. Joint procurement of parts would create significant cost 
savings for both companies. In order to encourage mutual learning and exchange of best 
practices Renault and Nissan set up a simple but very effective practice. At the heart of 
RNPO were Global Supplier Account Managers (GSAM), which were responsible for 
purchasing strategy, sourcing decisions, performance evaluation and supplier 
assessment. Each GSAM was supported by a Deputy GSAM. Each GSAM had a deputy 
GSAM from the alliance partner, thus if the GSAM was a Renault employee his Deputy 
GSAM would be a Nissan employee and vice versa. This set up created a “ mirror effect 
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“. Consequently Nissan was able to learn from Renault in the selection of suppliers, 
which inherently brought significant cost savings for Nissan. Renault on the other hand 
was able to learn from Nissan’s quality management. Potential difficulties were to be 
solved in finding a consensus which parts should be purchased jointly via RNPO, since 
both companies were operating in different markets with different requirements and 
standards. Nevertheless by 2002 RNPO purchases already accounted for 30% of total 
combined purchasing. Management was determined that joint procurement would 
exceed 40% within a year and eventually amount to 70%. 
• Research and Development 
By sharing basic research and development both companies could realize significant cost 
savings. The first joint R&D operation was a program for fuel-cell technologies. 
• Manufacturing 
Regarding manufacturing Nissan was definitely the stronger partner in the alliance. 
Nissan was famous for its manufacturing capability and had some of the most productive 
plants in the U.S and Europe. At its plant in Europe Nissan achieved an annual output of 
101 cars per year compared to only 77 at Renault. Nissan’s advantage in productivity 
basically came from strong standardization of the production process, which was 
uncommon to Renault. Additionally Nissan provided Renault with synchronous 
production technique, which was a measure to more efficiently organize the upstream 
logistics. Thus parts could be delivered at the right time and in the corresponding order 
which helped to decrease in-process inventories and ultimately costs. The knowledge 
exchange between Renault and Nissan employees was achieved through the placement 
of Nissan engineers at Renault plants, which would provide continuous assistance. 
Nissan on the other hand was able to draw from Renault’s cost management of the 
plants. The cooperation in manufacturing was probably the hardest task, since Nissan 
employees felt that Nissan was contributing much more to the cooperation than Renault. 
Even though this was the case in manufacturing Nissan benefited from Renault’s 
expertise in other areas. 
• Joint Distribution 
By combining their distribution networks Renault and Nissan could guarantee each other 
mutual entrance to previously inaccessible markets. In the case of Renault this market 
would be the U.S, Asia and Australia. Nissan would make use of Renault’s existing 
distribution networks in Europe and South America. Apart from Europe, where Nissan 
only had little presence, South America was an attractive opportunity. Despite Renault’s 
existing infrastructure, the company’s market share was diminishing, which was due to 
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the fact that Renault’s small and medium sized cars barely matched the requirements of 
the South American market. The need to transport large groups of people and bad road 
conditions were much more appealing to Nissan with its pick up trucks and other large 4 
wheel drive vehicles. Renault’s entry into Japan turned out to be a more difficult task due 
to the resentment of the Japanese market for non Japanese cars. The overall market 
share of foreign brands was at about 5% with the majority of foreign brands being 
German premium and luxury brands. 
• Joint Information Systems 
A harmonization of information systems was perceived to be important to further 
strengthen the alliance. The Renault Nissan Information System would harmonize 
existing logistics, production and distribution systems. In a next step RNIS would also 
include the manufacturing and production systems. 
• Platform Sharing 
By utilizing the same platforms Renault and Nissan could achieve significant cost savings 
but still retain a distinctive design and brand image. As a Renault manager stated “ A 
platform is the part of the car the customer doesn’t see “. Still cars that were sharing the 
same platform also shared several important parts such as engines and gear boxes. 
Prior to the merger Nissan had as many as 24 platforms, which resulted from a failed 
brand strategy. Renault on the other Hand had only 8 platforms. Renault and Nissan 
agreed that they would use a total of 10 platforms for all cars. The first two commonly 
used platforms were introduced in 2002 and were designed for small and compact cars. 
It was estimated that the two platforms would account for more than 50% of total 
production volume by 2006 and thus be among the three most commonly used platforms 
worldwide. 
 
4.5. Alliance vs. M&A as a Mean for Consolidation 
Fujimoto and Heller have studied classical mergers and alliances in the auto industry. The 
next paragraph gives an overview of their main findings and relates them to the two cases.  
Fujimoto and Heller125 address the question which of the two forms is the more suitable for 
inter firm linkage, alliance or M&A. The answer to that is not straight forward, since the 
optimal choice depends on the circumstances of the transaction. If the ultimate goal is firm 
size a classical M&A is the right solution, since a larger hierarchically unified entity is 
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instantly created. If mutual learning and capability building is the ultimate goal of the 
transaction, then an alliance provides the better solution. 
 
Hamel126 finds that an advantage of a capability driven alliance, as is the case with Renault 
Nissan, is that entering into the alliance and effectively managing it’s inter-firm relationship, 
enables the participating firms to avoid a full take-over merger, where the entire bundle of 
resources of another firm, including non-distinct assets, have to be purchased and 
organizational problems of post-merger integration tend to be larger. Barney127 notes that 
acquisitions are often only possible at a price, which precludes the acquirer from earning 
above normal profits as a result of the acquisition, which is consistent with the findings 
regarding the relationship between the amount of acquisition premium and its impact on 
value creation. Thus Fujimoto and Heller conclude that alliances enable firms to gain secure 
privileged access to the valuable capabilities of another firm at a reduced cost, which can be 
considered a more efficient use of a firm’s resources. I think that the main advantages of an 
alliance namely mutual learning and capability building are hard to achieve. As Barney 
explains capabilities are amalgamations of many different routines and practices within a firm 
and therefore socially complex, causally ambiguous and often path dependent, which makes 
them difficult to imitate and transfer. Fujimoto and Heller say that the first step to mutual 
learning and capability building is to try to maintain each entity’s distinctive capabilities. Only 
if each entity preserves its core capabilities, mutual learning can develop by further 
strengthening the existing capabilities while at the same time drawing upon the partner’s 
capabilities.  
However mutual learning can only be achieved in the appropriate framework. This framework 
falls under the responsibility of top management, which is responsible to provide the 
channels for mutual learning. In my opinion the dispatching of highly skilled key executives to 
the alliance counterpart proved to be very successful. Dispatched key executives  signal 
each partner’s willingness and commitment to the alliance. Furthermore they act as the key 
link and stimulator for capability building. Fujimoto and Heller find that128 this comes at 
relatively high human resource cost but this cost can be recouped if the managers apply their 
knowledge as dispatches after their return to their “home firm”.  
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They note that the basic pattern of the global automobile industry since the 1980s is going 
towards the formation of multi level global alliance networks with differing degrees of 
cooperation. Doz and Hamel129 support this view, where increased inter-firm cooperation are 
described as a product of intensifying “ races for the world “ in which firms seek to capitalize 
on global opportunities and “ races for the future “ where firms rush to gain competitive 
advantage in new innovations. Cooperation takes place in the fields of management strategy, 
product planning and engineering, process engineering, sales and marketing and so forth. 
  
I will apply Fujimoto’s and Heller’s findings to the two cases. The merger of Daimler and 
Chrysler was originally intended to be a merger of equals, with the goal of creating a truly 
global car company, and thereby benefit from increased scale, operational synergies and to 
mutually benefit from each other’s capabilities. The envisaged equality of the two entities was 
not existent from the beginning, where Daimler held 58% in Daimler Chrysler and Chrysler 
the remaining 42%. It was clear that Daimler intended to be the stronger partner, although 
this was not the official version. I believe it was this discrepancy that was at the root of the 
difficulties associated with the Daimler Chrysler merger. From an outsider’s point of view the 
envisaged transaction would have been more suitable from an alliance approach, since both 
entities wanted to benefit from each others capabilities. The true intention from Daimler’s 
side seemed different however and might have been a reason why the merger solution was 
chosen. Even during the implementation of the merger, there were little efforts from Daimler’s 
side to truly integrate Chrysler. This was perceived by Chrysler and among other factors led 
to the resignation of several Chrysler key executives. From then on not only former Chrysler 
employees but also Chrysler shareholders sensed that Daimler was playing a crooked game 
with Chrysler. For that reason Chrysler’s former biggest shareholder and a major Daimler 
Chrysler shareholder Kirk Kerkorian filed a law suit against Daimler Chrysler in 2000. In the 
short run a merger seems to be the more simple approach, due to more transparency and as 
compared to an alliance, clear hierarchical structures. Never the less it is still necessary to 
promote mutual integration otherwise the two entities rather drift apart than moving closer 
together. In the end a merger is much more complex than simply adding up the balance 
sheets especially in large cross border transactions. It is essential to create a common 
corporate identity, while at the same time respecting the distinct capabilities of each entity. 
As demonstrated with Daimler Chrysler the social and intercultural barriers were 
underestimated and ultimately resulted in a failure. Furthermore I believe that Daimler was 
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mainly going for size, but they communicated a different message to Chrysler. If Daimler had 
revealed its true intentions earlier maybe the merger would have never happened. 
  
Despite the fact that Nissan was in a severe financial position and needed a partner to save 
it from bankruptcy, it seems to me that both Renault and Nissan have taken a more 
systematic approach. The decision to form an alliance was based on a true intention to 
benefit from mutual learning and capability building in the long run. The alliance partners 
seemed to have been more aware of their own and their counterpart’s abilities, thus they 
could focus on how to exchange them. From the beginning Renault encouraged the 
exchange of knowledge by the establishment of the so called cross company teams. Nissan 
showed slight resistance at the beginning since they were afraid to loose their unique 
production capabilities for financial help and few soft skills basically in product procurement 
and marketing. However this resistance was soon overcome as Nissan realized that Renault 
was putting a lot of effort in the alliance for both partners to work. Finding the appropriate 
balance for both partners to feel that they are in a win-win situation, a none of them is worse 
off, is one of the key managerial challenges of alliance based inter firm linkage. As compared 
to a “ normal “ merger the overall effort is probably higher due to the coordinative complexity. 
If this barrier is overcome as in the case of Renault and Nissan the alliance will in the long 
run be the more effective mean for mutual learning and capability building. 
5. Conclusion 
In order to understand where the value creation potential in mergers and acquisitions lies 
one has to understand the basic framework and underlying assumptions behind them. Thus 
the introductory chapter provides a short overview of recent merger waves, M&A history and 
the several stages of the M&A process. The first chapter should not only have made the 
reader understand the basic concept of M&A but also underlined its complexity, which I 
believe is often underestimated. 
 
Chapter two addressed the main motivations behind mergers and acquisitions. Not 
surprisingly the most common motive in this respect is of economic nature. Apart from other 
motivations such as managerial or strategic, the economic perspective and in this respect 
especially economies of scale and scope determine the M&A decision in most cases. The 
concept of economies of scale and scope leads to the central issue of the thesis. Scale 
economies can only be achieved if certain size requirements are met, thus the following sub 
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section of chapter two introduces horizontal mega mergers. Apart from multi billion domestic 
and cross border transactions I also mention strategic alliances as an alternative. 
 
Having defined horizontal mega mergers and their characteristics, chapter three begins with 
the potential sources and limits of value creation in horizontal mega mergers. As I have 
outlined there are several sources apart from revenue enhancement and cost savings such 
as growth opportunities and other strategic advantages but they come at a high cost, the 
biggest challenge of all being the cultural barrier. However there are certain value drivers, 
which have a great positive effect on value creation if they are applied properly. During my 
research I found that there still is a lack of empirical evidence of value creation in mega 
mergers and thus further research in that direction would be useful. The existing evidence is 
mixed and suggests that mega mergers behave similar to the average merger, which implies 
that there is no significant relationship between transaction size and value creation. One 
finding however is certain, that the number of mega mergers has significantly increased in 
previous years.  
 
Chapter four related the theoretical insights of the previous chapters to a practical example, 
here the two case studies of Daimler Chrysler and Renault Nissan. It should have become 
clear that such mega mergers require more than just financial muscle. An important 
determinant of value creation, which is often neglected, is post merger integration. In the long 
term I truly believe that post merger integration separates successful transactions from the 
less successful ones. Success or failure lie closely together but ultimately depend on the 
merging partners’ willingness and ability to give up their own corporate identity and 
organizational routines in order to create a new combined entity, which embodies the best 
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7.1. German Summary 
Die Diplomarbeit mit dem Titel “ Value Creation in Horizontal Mega Mergers at the Example 
of Daimler Chrysler and Renault Nissan “ behandelt das Thema der Wertschöpfung in 
großen M&A (“M&A“ steht für Mergers and Acquisitions was ins Deutsche übersetzt 
Fusionen und Übernahmen bedeutet) Transaktionen. Wertschöpfung kann in diesem 
Zusammenhang primär als monetärer Zuwachs aller Beteiligten, hier aber insbesondere der 
Aktionäre der jeweils betroffenen Unternehmen verstanden werden. Der mögliche 
Vermögens- Zuwachs bzw. Verlust wird dabei ab dem Zeitpunkt der Verlautbarung bis zur 
tatsächlichen Verschmelzung der beteiligten Unternehmen betrachtet, wobei der Zeitpunkt 
der Verschmelzung in diesem Fall nicht unbedingt der Zeitpunkt der rechtlichen 
Zusammenführung sondern vielmehr die tatsächliche operative Verschmelzung der vormals 
unabhängigen Unternehmen ist.        
 
Um ein Verständnis für die Materie und die daraus resultierenden Fragestellungen zu 
bekommen liefern die ersten zwei Kapitel das theoretische Grundgerüst von Mergers & 
Acquisitions. Neben einem kurzen Überblick der unmittelbaren Geschichte von M&A, 
umreiße ich die einzelnen Stufen einer M&A Transaktion sowie deren wirtschaftliche und 
strategische Beweggründe. Da „Horizontale Mega Merger “ nicht immer zwangsläufig die 
optimale Lösung für die Erreichung bestimmter Ziele sind stelle ich in diesem 
Zusammenhang Strategische Allianzen als Alternative vor. 
 
Kapitel drei beschäftigt sich hauptsächlich mit der zentralen Frage der Wertschöpfung in 
“horizontalen Mega Mergern“. Um diese Frage zu beantworten ist es wichtig vorerst die 
bestehenden Wertschöpfungspotentiale sowie gleichermaßen deren Grenzen aufzuzeigen. 
In einem weiteren Unterpunkt fasse ich die gängigsten Ratschläge, primär aus Fachliteratur, 
zur tatsächlichen Wertschöpfung bei “Horizontalen Mega Mergern“ zusammen. Der letzte 
Unterpunkt von Kapitel drei beschäftigt sich mit bestehenden empirischen Studien zu dem 
Thema Wertschöpfung bei “Mega Mergern“. Nach intensiver Recherche komme ich hier zu 
dem Schluss, dass weitere wissenschaftliche Nachforschungen in diesem Bereich sehr 
hilfreich wären, da die bestehenden empirischen Daten sehr unterschiedlich sind und daher 
nur ein unklares Urteil zulassen. Auf Grund der bestehenden Datenlage komme ich 
grundsätzlich zum Schluss, dass die Wertschöpfung bei Mega Transaktionen in etwa mit der 
Wertschöpfung normaler Transaktionen übereinstimmt. Daraus schließe ich weiters das 
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Wertschöpfung nicht unmittelbar mit der Transaktionsgröße zusammenhängt oder anders 
ausgedrückt, dass die Größe der beteiligten Unternehmen einer M&A Transaktion keinen 
messbaren Einfluss auf deren Wertschöpfungspotential hat.   
 
Kapitel 4 versucht die gewonnen Erkenntnisse aus dem theoretischen Teil der Arbeit anhand 
zweier Fallbeispiele aus der Praxis zu verdeutlichen. Die herangezogenen Fallbeispiele 
stammen aus der Autoindustrie und beziehen sich auf die Fusion von Daimler und Chrysler 
und die strategische Zusammenarbeit von Renault und Nissan. Die Fallbeispiele sollen wie 
bereits im Theorieteil erwähnt zwei unterschiedliche Lösungswege, Komplettübernahme oder 
strategische Allianz, zur Erreichung des selben Ziels demonstrieren. Das Ziel war in diesem 
Fall die Sicherung des weiteren Bestehens auf dem Markt sowie zukünftiges Wachstum in 
einer stark konsolidierenden Branche. Weiters gehe ich kurz auf die transaktionsspezifischen 
Chancen und Risiken der einzelnen Fallbeispiele sowie deren zugrunde liegenden 
Motivationen ein. Die Fallbeispiele verdeutlichen, dass Erfolg und Misserfolg nahe 
beieinander liegen aber vor allem die Wichtigkeit von “Post Merger Integration“. 
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